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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A STUDY ON THE RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMIC 
VALUE ADDED 
The Case of Korea Tourism Organization 
 
 
This paper examines the issues concerning the responsibility accounting and EVA as a 
one of the best measures of shareholder economic value and the financial management 
tool for organizational profitability measurement within the organization. This paper 
also attempt to present a management accounting model on linking the responsibility 
accounting to economic value added (EVA) for departmental cost control and 
performance evaluation of Korea Tourism Organization (KTO). The management 
accounting model on combining responsibility costs and EVA based on the case of KTO 
using CAPM and pure-play methodology shows that the responsibility accounting needs 
to reflect company’s balance sheet and hence to account for the full cost of capital 
employed in business. Including capital charges, the responsibility accounting system 
provides more accurate information about responsibility costs and hence makes 
management and managers focus their attention on the real full costs of resources 
consumed with the most leverage for increasing economic profits. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As many researchers note, companies generally decentralize decision-making 
authority in order to make better use of local knowledge. Moreover, such firms tend to 
be organized into divisions to achieve greater accountability and stronger incentives to 
increase value or to control the free-rider problem (Zimmerman, 1997; Kaplan and 
Atkinson, 1998; Jensen and Meckling, 1999).  
As a result divisional cost control and performance measurement are a hot topic 
and one of the critical factors determine how divisions and individuals in an 
organization behave. The conception about divisional cost control and performance 
evaluation concerns the responsibility accounting compared with the full cost 
accounting and the widespread practice of evaluating the divisions of decentralized, 
multi-divisional firms as if the divisions were independent companies. Divisional 
performance measurement, as Jensen and Meckling (1999) claim, includes subjective as 
well as objective assessments of the performance of both individuals and subunits of an 
organization.  
 Besides the characteristics of the decentralized organizations, the emphasis on 
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responsibility accounting is reinforced. Benston (1963) describes responsibility 
accounting as making the smallest areas of responsibility the fundamental building 
blocks of the accounting system and facilitating effective motivation. With a system of 
responsibility accounting, top management can afford to widen its span of control and 
allow operating decisions to be made on a decentralized basis (Benston, 1963).1 Thus 
Anthony et al. (2005) emphasized responsibility center managers need information 
about what has taken in their respective areas of responsibility for management control 
purposes and responsibility accounting identified the amount of costs that each of 
responsibility center managers is responsible for. Furthermore, if the performance 
measures are to have the desired effects on the behavior of an organization’s members, 
the reward and punishment system must link rewards with performance in a clear and 
consistent way. The performance measures should also be consistent with the ways in 
which decision rights are allocated throughout an organization.2
Therefore, as Hubbell (1996) argues, for internal management information systems 
to serve the best interests of both shareholders and managers, they must identify, collect, 
and routinely report the information that is critical to making decisions about resource 
                                                          
1 George J. Benston. “The role of The Firms Accounting System for Motivation,” The Accounting 
Review(April 1963), pp.347-354. 
2 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling. “Special Knowledge and Divisional Performance 
Measurement,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance(Summer 1999), pp.8-17. 
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allocations. However, as Hubbell (1996) notes, traditional accounting system including 
responsibility accounting have ignored the balance sheet and failed to account for the 
full cost of capital. Responsibility costs are therefore underestimated. The advanced 
perspective, presented by him, suggests that while traditional accounting systems 
successfully focus management’s attention on cost drivers as the means to managing 
costs, they do not identify critical capital charge drivers as a means of managing 
capital.3 As a consequence, if the responsibility accounting system could be modified to 
include capital costs in a more objective and accurate way, the result will be an 
improved management system which helps managers focus on all the necessary 
elements of creating corporate value, including operating costs and capital charges.  
With all of these, this paper investigates the topics concerning the responsibility 
accounting (responsibility centers, cost allocations and transfer prices) and EVA as a 
one of the best measures of shareholder economic value and also, the financial 
management tool for organizational profitability measurement within the organization. 
Also, this study aims to present a management accounting model on linking the 
responsibility accounting to EVA for departmental cost control and performance 
measurement of Korea Tourism Organization (KTO). 
                                                          
3 William W. Hubbell. “Combining Economic Value Added and Activity-Based Management,” Journal of 
Cost Management(Spring 1996), pp.18-29. 
3 
 
The paper is organized as follows: The first section examines antecedent literature 
on the issues concerning the responsibility accounting studies. The first part will explore 
the incentives for decentralization in organizations and its advantages and disadvantages. 
The second part will describe the types and definition of responsibility centers. The 
third part will explain the issues in the responsibility center accounting: transfer price 
and cost allocation. Finally, we will review the case of responsibility center approach 
and its limitations.  
The second describes economic value added (EVA) as a performance measure 
and its usefulness, explaining the measurement method of EVA and the need for 
combining responsibility accounting and EVA.  
      The third explains the case of KTO, one of the government-owned corporations 
and also one of multi-business companies. The first part overviews KTO, explores its 
business activity and past financial performance by business segment. The second 
analyzes the responsibility accounting model currently applied in the KTO and suggests 
the solutions to the problems of KTO’s existing management accounting system. 
     The fourth section is building up responsibility centers in KTO, setting up cost 
assignment method, reorganizing financial statement and measuring divisional EVA of 
the company through the methodology that is described in section two and three. 
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     The last section presents the conclusion, limitations and suggestions for future 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING 
 
1. Background of the Responsibility Accounting 
The complex environment in which business is conducted today makes it 
impossible for any individual or central group to possess all the relevant information, 
experience, time, and computational power to determine the detailed operating plans for 
the organization. In practice, no central management can possibly know everything 
about an organization’s many activities. Therefore, central management cannot make all 
the decisions for lower-level managers. Many organizations faced with today’s 
increasing competitive pressures are changing the way they are organized and the way 
they do business. This is necessary because they must be able to change quickly in a 
world where technology, customer tastes, and competitors’ strategies are constantly 
changing. Many decisions must be made at the lower or local levels of any organization 
(Atkinson et al., 2004).  
As Atkinson et al. (2004) argue, being adaptive generally requires that the 
organization’s senior management delegate or decentralize decision-making 
responsibility to more people in the organization. Decentralization allows motivated and 
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well-trained organization members to identify changing customer tastes quickly and 
gives frontline employees the authority and responsibility to develop plans to react to 
these changes (Atkinson et al., 2004).4
1-1. Incentives for Decentralization in Organization 
     The first question to be addressed is: Why is a decentralized organizational 
structure employed? 5  As Zimmerman (1979) argues, generally limited cognitive 
capacity of the principal and the existence of investment alternatives with positive net 
present values leads the principal to delegate (or assign) decision-making responsibility 
to an agent: hence, decentralization.  
     Centralization and large size make perception of the workers’ needs difficult. 
Communication between the decision makers and those who carry out their decisions 
becomes complicated and subject to more interference (“noise”).6 Thus Benston (1963) 
also argued decentralization characterized by the autonomy of action given the 
department manager by top management serves both to allow the managers the 
necessary freedom and authority needed for motivation and to encourage them to 
supervise their workers effectively. 
                                                          
4 Anthony A. Atkinson, Robert S. Kaplan, and S. Mark Young. Management Accounting. Prentice Hall, 
2004, pp.529. 
5 Jerold L. Zimmerman. “The Costs and Benefits of Cost Allocations,” The Accounting Review(July 1979), 
pp.504-521. 
6 George J. Benston. “The role of The Firms Accounting System for Motivation,” The Accounting 
Review(April 1963), pp.347-354. 
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     And also, Jensen and Meckling (1999) align corporate decision-making authority 
with valuable “specific knowledge” inside the organization. 
They define specific knowledge as knowledge costly to transfer among agents and not 
easily observable by other agents. General knowledge is information transferable among 
agents at low cost or easily observable by other agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1999). 
Consequently Jensen and Meckling’s (1999) theory describes when the relevant 
knowledge is specific and when technology is unable to lower the cost of transfer 
substantially, the appropriate approach to moving the knowledge is to move the decision 
rights to those agents who possess the relevant specific knowledge. 
7     In addition to the researches mentioned above, Kaplan and Atkinson (1998)  
presented seven specific incentives for firms to decentralize: 1) the environment of the 
firm, 2) information specialization, 3) timeliness of response, 4) conservation of the 
central management time, 5) computational complexity, 6) training for local managers, 
and 7) motivation for local managers. Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) also argued that 
different members in the organization have different bodies of knowledge and abilities 
to act. Thus it is impossible for any individual or central group to possess all the 
relevant information, experience, time, and computational power to determine the 
                                                          
7 Robert S. Kaplan, and Anthony A. Atkinson. Advanced Management Accounting. Prentice Hall, 1998, 
pp.290-293 
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detailed operating plans for the organization. 
1-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Decentralization  
The arguments for decentralization seem compelling (Kaplan and Atkinson, 
1998).8 9 Garrison and Noreen (2003)  holds that although most organizations fall 
somewhere between two extremes: total decentralization and total centralization, there 
is a pronounced trend toward more and more decentralization.  
10How much decentralization is optimal?  To answer this question, as Horngren et 
al. (2003) emphasized, the degree of decentralization that maximizes the benefits over 
costs of should be chosen. Thus the cost-benefit approach helps top management focus 
on the issues.  
11Horngren et al. (2003)  summarize the benefits of decentralization into five 
components: 1) creates greater responsiveness to local needs, 2) leads to gains from 
quicker decision making, 3) increases motivation of subunit managers, 4) aids 
management development and learning, and 5) sharpens the focus of subunit managers. 
Also, Garrison and Noreen (2003) identify the advantages of decentralization as 
follows: First, top management s concentration on setting broad strategic direction 
                                                          
8 Robert S. Kaplan, and Anthony A. Atkinson. Advanced Management Accounting. Prentice Hall, 1998, 
pp.293. 
9 Ray H. Garrison, and Eric W. Noreen. Managerial Accounting. Mc Graw Hill, 2003, pp.526. 
10 Charles T. Horngren, Srikant M. Datar, and George Foster. Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis. 
Pretice Hall, 2003, pp.756. 
11 Ibid. 
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through relieving them of day-to-day operating decisions. Second, providing lower-
level managers with vital experience in making decisions. Third, increased job 
satisfaction with added responsibility and decision-making authority. Forth, lower-level 
managers’ decision-making based on more detailed and up-to-date information.  
On the other hand, Horngren et al. (2003) point out four costs of decentralizing 
decision making: 1) leads to suboptimal decision making, 2) focuses manager attention 
on the subunit rather the organization as a whole, 3) increases costs of gathering 
information, and 4) results in duplication of activities. According to Garrison and 
Noreen (2003), decentralization has also four major disadvantages: First, lower-level 
managers’ decision making without fully understanding the company s strategy. Second, 
lack of coordination among autonomous managers. Third, lower-level managers’ 
objectives different from the objectives of the entire organization. Fourth, more 
difficulty to effectively spread innovative ideas. 
12 Therefore, as Kaplan and Atkinson (1998)  point out, although decentralization 
seems essential for organizing complex operations, it introduces many problems of its 
own: problems of goal congruence, problems of externalities, and overconsumption of 
perquisites. The challenge is to devise the right combination of delegation of effort and 
                                                          
12 Robert S. Kaplan, and Anthony A. Atkinson. Advanced Management Accounting. Prentice Hall, 1998, 
pp.300-303. 
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decision making, observation of effort, and reward or incentive schemes to balance the 
benefits and costs of decentralization. 
1-3. Decentralization and Responsibility Accounting   
13      Benston (1963)  argues that decentralization, which is characterized by the 
autonomy of action given the department manager by top management, serves both to 
allow the managers the necessary freedom and authority needed for motivation and to 
encourage them to supervise their workers effectively.  
According to Benston (1963), decentralization is aided effectively by responsibility 
accounting. That is, top management can afford to give authority to the department 
manager, since it can control the basic activities of the department with the help of 
accounting reports of performance. Furthermore, he stresses accounting reports may 
serve as reliable means of communications, wherein top management can inform the 
manager of the goals of the firm that it expects to fulfill (Benston, 1963).14
15Anthony et al. (2004)  defines responsibility accounting as the management 
accounting construct that deals with both planned and actual accounting information 
about the inputs and outputs of a responsibility center. Responsibility accounting 
                                                          
13 George J. Benston. “The role of The Firms Accounting System for Motivation,” The Accounting 
Review(April 1963), pp.347-354. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Robert N. Anthony, David F. Hawkins, and Kenneth A. Merchant. Accounting: Text and Cases. 
Mc Graw Hill, 2004, pp.707. 
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focuses on responsibility centers. It is to be contrasted with full cost accounting, which 
focuses on goods and services rather than on responsibility centers. This difference in 
focus is what distinguishes responsibility accounting from full cost accounting 
(Anthony et al., 2004).  
<Table 1> Contrast between Full Costs and Responsibility Costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Unit : KRW amounts in mil.) Total Whisky Wine
Cost elements:
   Cost of goods sold 20,000     14,000     6,000       
   Salaries 13,000     8,000       5,000       
   Rent expense 9,620       5,920       3,700       
   Selling and administration 5,500       3,645       1,855       
       Total costs 48,120     31,565     16,555     
(Unit : KRW amounts in mil.) Total DF Shop Purchasing Promotion
Cost elements:
   Cost of goods sold 20,000     20,000     
   Salaries 13,000     10,000     1,500       1,500       
   Supervision 4,240       2,560       840          840          
   Other labor costs 6,970       2,670       2,200       2,100       
   Supplies 1,290       990          100          200          
   Other costs 2,620       1,320       500          800          
       Total costs 48,120     37,540     5,140       5,440       
Panel B. Responsibility Costs
Teams (Responsibility Centers)
Panel A. Full Product Costs
Table 1 depicts an international airport duty-free shop in the KTO with only three 
teams: duty-free shop is the operating team; purchasing team provides goods to sell; and 
planning & promotion team performs all selling and administrative activities. Panel A 
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of the Table 1 presents the full costs of the company during the certain period and the 
cost elements that accounts for these full costs. On the contrary, responsibility 
accounting identifies the costs that three team managers are held accountable for 
respectively, as shown in panel B of the Table 1. 
As a consequence assigning costs to the team managers who have control over 
their incurrence is a factor in encouraging these managers to exercise effectively their 
authority to motivate their supervisees. Also, the managers’ performance in this regard 
is measured by the accounting reports, which are likely to be an incentive for the 
effective motivation of the managers (Benston, 1963). 
2. Types and Definition of Responsibility Centers  
Responsibility center is broadly defined as an organization subunit(division, 
department, section, and so on) headed by a manager who is held responsible for 
controlling over cost, revenue, or investment funds (Maciariello and Kirby, 1994; 
Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998; Garrison and Noreen, 2003; Horngren et al., 2003). 
Maciarello and Kirby (1994) explain responsibility centers form an organizational 
hierarchy or a means-end chain in pursuit of organizational goals. 
Figure 1 shows a responsibility center is an organizational unit that uses inputs in 
the form of labor, materials, and capital and converts them into outputs consisting of 
13 
 
products and services (Maciarello and Kirby, 1994). 
<Figure 1> Schematic Representation of a Responsibility Center 
 
Inputs:                                                        Outputs:             
Labor                                                         Products 
Material                                                       Services 
 
Responsibility Center 
Capital 
 
     Most accounting researchers presents five types of decentralized organizational 
units: 1) standard cost centers, 2) revenue centers, 3) discretionary expense centers, 4) 
profit centers, and 5) investment centers (Anthony et al., 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 
1999; Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998; Maciarello and Kirby, 1994). And these 
responsibility centers differ depending on the degree of authority and accountability 
given to the local manager. 
     As a result, there are five different types of responsibility centers and related 
financial performance measurement systems to link together decentralized decision 
making (Jensen and Meckling, 1999). We briefly discuss these types of organization 
units. 
     Standard Cost Centers; Standard cost centers can be established whenever we 
can define and measure output well and can specify the amount of inputs required to 
produce each unit of output. They can be used for any repetitive operation for which we 
14 
 
can measure the physical amount of output and specify a production function relating 
inputs to outputs. Thus, standard cost centers can be established in both manufacturing 
and service industries (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). 
16    As Jensen and Meckling (1999)  argue, standard cost centers are designed to 
encourage managers to focus on increasing the efficiency of the production process 
without the distractions caused by changes in demand conditions that would affect them 
if revenues were included in the performance measure. 
Revenue Centers; Revenue center acquires finished goods from a manufacturing 
division and is responsible for selling and distributing those good. However, it is not 
held accountable for the costs of the goods or services that the center sells (Anthony et 
al., 2004; Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998).  
Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) present when a performance measure is chosen for a 
revenue center, some notion of the cost of each product should be included so that the 
center is motivated to maximize gross operating margins rather than just sales revenue. 
Discretionary Expense Centers; Discretionary expense centers are appropriate 
for units that produce outputs that are not measurable in financial terms or for units 
where no strong relation exists between resources expended and results achieved 
                                                          
16 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling. “Special Knowledge and Divisional Performance 
Measurement,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance(Summer 1999), pp.8-17. 
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(Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). That is, the providers of internal administrative services 
such as human resources, patent management, and public relations are commonly 
organized as discretionary expense centers (Jensen and Meckling, 1999). 
    Because of the weak relationship between inputs and outputs in these responsibility 
centers, however, it is very difficult to measure output, so neither effectiveness nor 
efficiency can be determined. Instead, companies use controls on the inputs used by the 
discretionary expense centers than using results control. And the control of 
discretionary expense centers requires the informed judgment of knowledgeable 
professionals on the level an quality of service the centers are producing (Kaplan and 
Atkinson, 1998). 
Profit Centers; Units in which the managers have almost complete operational 
decision-making responsibility and are evaluated on the difference between its revenues 
and costs as defined by the measurement system (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1999).  
    According to Jensen and Meckling (1999), when the knowledge required to make 
decisions about the product mix, quantity, and quality is specific to the division and 
therefore costly or impossible for managers at higher levels in the hierarchy to obtain, 
the profit center can be an effective performance measurement system. 
16 
 
Investment Centers; A subunit is designated an investment center if it has control 
not only over sales revenues and operating costs but also over the assets employed in 
producing profit (Maciarello and Kirby, 1994). Investment centers, as Jensen and 
Meckling (1999) claim, are performance measurement systems that take into account 
the efficiency of asset utilization. 
    Investment centers are generalizations of profit centers in which profitability is 
related to the assets used to generate the profit. Return on investment (ROI) and 
economic value added which is the best flow measure of performance currently known 
are typical investment center performance measures (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1999). 
17    In addition to investment centers mentioned above, Marc Hodak (2000)  
introduces EVA center defined as any business unit whose financial results are tracked 
in terms of economic value added, or EVA. 
3. Issues in the Responsibility Accounting System Design 
3-1. Proper Cost Allocations in Responsibility Centers   
Despite many accounting researchers view that cost allocations are essentially an 
arbitrary and serve no useful purpose, cost allocations are popular in practice 
                                                          
17 Marc Hodak. “The Viable EVA Center(Or, How TO Slice a Company So It Doesn t Bleed),” Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance(Fall 2000), pp.71-79. 
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18(Zimmerman, 1979; Blanchard and Chow, 1983). Blanchard and Chow (1983)  present 
the surveys by Imhoff (1978), Chiu and Lee (1981), and Fremgen and Liao (1981) 
reflecting this practice. They found that absorption costing is commonly used for 
internal decision making and reporting purposes, allocating corporate indirect costs 
among their primary responsibility centers.  
Some Rationales for Cost Allocations   
Why do firms continue to allocate costs for internal reporting purposes?  
Zimmerman’s examples illustrate that cost allocations can act as a lump-sum tax which 
reduce the manager s consumption of perquisites and that cost allocations can serve as 
useful proxy variables for certain difficult-to-observe costs (Zimmerman, 1979). His 
cases 19  suggest that cost allocations might be useful devices for controlling and 
motivating managers. Also, Blanchard and Chow (1983) argue cost allocations can be a 
potent tool in motivating greater goal congruence between a firm and its employee. 
Costs and Benefits of Cost Allocations   
20    Zimmerman (1979)  examines the reasons why the firms allocate cost. He 
provides some concrete examples and sufficient conditions which support Horngren’s 
                                                          
18 Garth A. Blanchard, and Chee W. Chow. “Allocating Indirect Costs for Improved Management 
Performance,” Management Accounting (March 1983), pp.38-41. 
19 Jerold L. Zimmerman. “The Costs and Benefits of Cost Allocations,” The Accounting Review (July 
1979), pp.504-521. 
20 Ibid. 
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(1977) and Kaplan’s (1977) conjectures: cost allocations are linked to managerial 
behavior (Zimmerman, 1979). Furthermore, he demonstrates that situations exist in 
which cost allocations yield positive net benefits to the firm.  
According to his analysis, cost allocations appear to proxy for certain hard-to-
observe costs that arise when decision-making responsibilities are assigned to and 
vested in various individuals (i.e., decentralized) within the firm.21 He discusses, as 
shown below, two specific situations: 1) controlling the agent s overconsumption of 
perquisites and 2) proxying the costs of degraded service, delay, and future expansion 
that arise when a common resource is shared by several decision makers (Zimmerman, 
1979). Also, Blanchard and Chow (1983)22 summarize the possible benefits from cost 
allocations into two elements: 1) goal congruence in the decentralized firm by reducing 
slack using the allocation of indirect costs, and 2) more optimal allocation of scarce 
resources. 
Controlling the Agent s Overconsumption of Perquisites 
    Can cost allocations reduce the overconsumption of perquisites? Zimmerman 
(1979)23 describes cost allocations can act as a lump-sum tax which reduces an agent’s 
                                                          
21 Op.cit., pp.519. 
22 Garth A. Blanchard, and Chee W. Chow. “Allocating Indirect Costs for Improved Management 
Performance,” Management Accounting (March 1983), pp.38-41. 
23 Jerold L. Zimmerman. “The Costs and Benefits of Cost Allocations,” The Accounting Review (July 
1979), pp.508-509. 
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discretionary spending on perquisites in Figure 2. The principal is taxing the 
responsibility center by allocating $T of the principal s overhead to the responsibility 
<Figure 2> Overhead as a Lump-Sum Tax to Reduce Discretionary Spending 
 
 
 
I2 
I1 
I0
T 
A A 1 
B
C
D
B 1 C 1
D 1 
E* E1 E 2 
C 2
Dollars of Expenditures
on Factors Valued by the 
Agent as Perquisites 
center. The responsibility center manager faces a new opportunity set, A B C D1 B1 1 1. 
(A1B1C D1 1 B is a vertical downward shift in ABCD by $T.) As shown in Figure 2, the new 
optimum level of perquisites after the allocation of $T is C1, and the level of perquisites 
is reduced from E  to E . 2 1
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More Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources 
24Based on Zimmerman’s (1979) argument, Blanchard and Chow (1983)  hold 
increasing use of a corporate service (such as a computer center, a typing pool, or a 
maintenance shop) by organizational subunits can still entail increasing costs to the firm 
as a whole. Zimmerman points out this effect is due to increase in opportunity costs, 
which can arise in numerous ways.25 These kinds of opportunity costs arise out of use 
of a service by one unit causing delays for other potential users and degradation of 
service (Zimmerman, 1979; Blanchard and Chow, 1983). Figure 3 depicts the situation 
under discussion. Even though the out-of-pocket cost for this service remains constant, 
total cost for this service to the firm is increasing (Blanchard and Chow, 1983). As 
described in Figure 3, the difference between the out-of-pocket and total costs is the 
opportunity costs of delay and service deterioration.  
    Therefore, if one assumes that the use of a service entails incremental costs to the 
firm, charging for this service related to usage could lead to more optimal utilization of 
this resource (Blanchard and Chow, 1983). 
 
 
                                                          
24 Garth A. Blanchard, and Chee W. Chow. “Allocating Indirect Costs for Improved Management 
Performance,” Management Accounting (March 1983), pp.40-41. 
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<Figure 3> Costs of Using a Fixed Service 
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per period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparison among Cost Allocation Methods 
Based on the benefits of cost allocation described above, this section discusses, as 
Shank and Govindarajan (1988)26 present, three different cost allocation approaches: 1) 
traditional costing approach, 2) modern costing approach, and 3) transaction costing 
approach.  
Shank and Govindarajan (1988)27 and Cooper and Kaplan (1988)28explain that in a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
25 Op.cit., pp.40. 
26 John K. Shank and Vijay Govindarajan. “The Perils of Cost Allocations Based on Production 
Volumes,” Accounting Horizons(December 1988), pp.71-79. 
27 John K. Shank and Vijay Govindarajan. “The Perils of Cost Allocations Based on Production 
Volumes,” Accounting Horizons(December 1988), pp.71-79. 
28 Robin Cooper and Robert S. Kaplan. “Measure Costs Right: Make the Right Decisions,” Harvard 
Business Review(September-October 1988), pp.96-103. 
Total cost to the firm. 
Opportunity cost. 
Out-of-pocket cost. 
Usage per period 
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traditional costing system the costs collected by overhead departments (responsibility 
centers) are assigned to production departments (operating departments) based on some 
relevant measure of activity (square feet of floor space for janitorial cost, machine value 
for insurance cost, employee head count for personnel cost, etc.). Then, after all costs 
have been assigned to production departments, costs are assign to units of product based 
on some measure of output volume in the production departments (Shank and 
Govindarajan, 1988). Then product costs used to consist primarily of direct labor and 
material.29 30 As Cooper and Kaplan (1988)  hold, the costs of direct and materials could 
be traced easily to individual products and distortions from allocating factory and 
corporate overhead by burden rates on direct labor were minor.  
31And Shank and Govindarajan (1988)  present modern costing system as a new 
approach to product costing which they incorporate three refinements to the traditional 
system: break out set-up labor from the overhead pool, break out the overhead that is 
more related to material cost, and substitute machine hours for labor hours as the 
measure of production volume. This refinements indicate there is a pool of material 
handling overhead separate from the pool of production overhead and the best measure 
                                                          
29 Norm Raffish. “How Much Does That Product Really Co$t?,” Management Accounting (March 1991): 
36-39. 
30 Robin Cooper and Robert S. Kaplan. “Measure Costs Right: Make the Right Decisions,” Harvard 
Business Review(September-October 1988), pp.96-103. 
31 John K. Shank and Vijay Govindarajan. “The Perils of Cost Allocations Based on Production 
Volumes,” Accounting Horizons(December 1988), pp.71-79. 
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of thruput has lost its salience because factories have become much less labor-paced and 
much more machines-paced in recent years (Shank and Govindarajan, 1988). 
On the other hand, as Cooper and Kaplan (1988) point out, today product lines and 
market channels have proliferated. Direct labor now represents a small fraction of 
corporate costs, while expenses covering factory support operations, marketing, 
distribution, engineering, and other overhead functions have exploded (Cooper and 
Kaplan, 1988; Raffish, 1991).  
Under such environment, volume-based approaches are no longer justifiable 
because it fails to reflect the true costs of products. Then Shank and Govindarajan 
(1988) present a much different system for allocating indirect costs─transaction-based 
overhead allocation. They argue fundamentally each component overhead is caused by 
some activity and so each product should be charged for a share of the component based 
on the proportion of that activity which it causes. Also, Cooper and Kaplan (1988) 
emphasize an activity-based system’s more sophisticated approach to attributing factory 
overhead, corporate overhead, and other organizational resources, first to activities and 
then to the products that create demand for these indirect resources. 
3-2. Transfer Pricing   
    Whenever multiple business units or divisions, especially in large companies 
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operating in multiple lines of business, transfer goods or services among themselves , 
measuring their performance requires that a transfer price be established for the goods 
and services exchanged (Brickley et al. , 1995). As explained in their example32, in 
order to evaluate the performance of responsibility centers, each of these internal 
transactions requires a transfer price. For each unit of the product transferred, the 
purchasing division pays the transfer price and the producing division receives the 
transfer price. 
Brickley et al. (1995) emphasize the importance of transfer price unit managers’ 
decisions (investment, purchasing, production, and so on) are based on. As shown in the 
case of Bellcore33, because incorrect transfer prices can result in inappropriate decisions, 
the reduced firm value, and also, inappropriate promotion and retention decisions, 
getting the transfer price right is important (Brickley et al., 1995; Kovac and Troy, 
1989). That is, only through the correct transfer prices will motivating individual 
business units to maximize profits serve to maximize profits for the firm as a whole 
(Brickley et al., 1995).   
Transfer Pricing under Perfect and Asymmetric Information   
                                                          
32 James Brickley, Clifford Smith, and Jerold Zimmerman. “Transfer Pricing and The Control of Internal 
Corporate Transactions,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance (Summer 1995), pp.60-67. 
33 Edward J. Kovac and Henry P. Troy. “Getting Transfer Prices Right: What Bellcore Did,” Harvard 
Business Review(September-October), pp.148-154. 
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    In theory, the optimal transfer price for a product or service is its opportunity cost 
or the value forgone by not using the product or service transferred in its next best 
alternative use.34 Brickley et al. (1995) claim the transfer price reflecting its opportunity 
cost accurately maximizes firm value. 
However, this simple rule mentioned above is often difficult to implement in 
reality. In practice, as Zimmerman (1997) and Brickley et al. (1995) argue, there can be 
considerable uncertainty about the factors that determine opportunity costs. Thus, 
accurate estimates of opportunity cost are generally the private information of only one 
division and, even then, arriving at such estimates often requires a special study.35  
That is, senior management’s difficulty to verify the accuracy of the information 
provided by the responsibility centers arises in large part because transfer prices are 
used in the performance evaluation and compensation systems. Operating managers 
whose bonuses are tied to their unit s measured profits have strong incentives to distort 
the information passed up to senior managers so as to influence the transfer price 
(Brickley et al., 1995). 
Common Transfer Pricing Methods  
 Because determining opportunity costs is expensive, managers resort to various 
                                                          
34 Jerold L. Zimmerman. “EVA and Divisional Performance Measurement: Capturing Synergies and 
Other Issues,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance(Summer 1997), pp.99-109. 
26 
 
lower-cost approximations (Brickley et al., 1995). Firms usually adopt at least four 
different ways that they can estimate the opportunity cost of the units transferred: 1) 
market price, 2) marginal production cost or variable cost, 3) full cost, and 4) negotiated 
price (Zimmerman, 1997; Brickley et al., 1995). As noted by Brickley et al. (1995), 
none of these alternatives perfectly represents opportunity cost in all situations and 
hence each firm must select a policy that best fits its circumstances. 
Market-Based Transfer Prices; The standard transfer-pricing rule is that given a 
competitive external market for the good, the product should be transferred at the 
external market price. That is, the use of market-based transfer prices is often assumed 
to produce the correct make-versus-buy decisions.  
However, if there are important synergies or interdependencies (greater quality 
control, protection of proprietary information, lower marketing costs, and so on)  
favoring internal production, the external market price is unlikely to capture them 
(Brickley et al., 1995). As a result, market price will not provide an accurate reflection 
of opportunity cost of producing inside in such situations. 
Marginal-Cost Transfer Prices; Marginal cost represents the value of the 
resources forgone to produce the last unit. Thus, if there is no external market for the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
35 Ibid. 
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intermediate good or if large synergies among business units cause the market price to 
be an inaccurate measure of opportunity cost, marginal production cost may be the most 
effective alternative transfer price (Brickley et al., 1995). 
But as with other transfer-pricing methods, there are problems with marginal cost 
as a measure of opportunity cost. Marginal cost is expensive to estimate and can lead to 
influence costs as managers debate whether certain expenditures are marginal or not 
(Brickley et al., 1995). 
Full-Cost Transfer Prices; Since full cost is the sum of fixed and marginal cost, 
full cost cannot be changed simply by reclassifying a fixed cost as a marginal cost. Thus, 
objective transfer-pricing rules such as those based on full accounting cost are widely  
used in practice primarily to avoid wasteful disputes over measuring marginal costs. 
However, full-cost transfer prices likely suffer from setting the transfer price 
above opportunity cost. The reason is that full-cost accounting generally overstates the 
opportunity cost to the firm of producing and transferring one more unit internally 
(Brickley et al., 1995). 
Despite the problem, full-cost transfer pricing is very common because of its 
important benefits of simplicity and low cost of implementation.   
Negotiated Transfer Prices; Transfer prices can be set by negotiation between 
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the purchasing and selling divisions. Both divisions can reach at the transfer prices that 
approximate opportunity cost through this method because the selling division will not 
agree to a price that is below its opportunity cost and the buying division will not pay a 
price that is above what it can buy the product for elsewhere. 
But negotiation is time consuming and can produce conflicts among divisions. 
Divisional performance measurement becomes sensitive to the relative negotiating skills 
of the two division managers. 
4. Framework for the Responsibility Accounting System 
4-1. Review of Case of Responsibility Center Approach   
The change of the athletic environment such as the emphasis on a broad-based 
athletic program and the pass of Title Ⅸ of the Equal Rights Amendment resulted in 
expanding operating expenses without additional revenues. All universities are 
concerned with increasing costs that far outpace static revenue flows. The 1980s were 
spent creating additional revenue streams, and the 1990s would be spent trying to 
control expenses and allocate revenue fairly. 
The responsibility center approach (RCA) was developed at Georgia Tech to 
enable it to survive the tightening cost environment and to guarantee a future for Tech s 
sports programs. Prior to the RCA, in many instances coaches and administrators make 
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important financial decisions using incomplete management information (e.g. Georgia 
Tech never included employee benefits or overhead costs). Strupeck et al. (1993)36 
shows the surplus (deficit) per sport analysis in Table 2. All revenues and expenses of 
the athletic department are analyzed and allocate to a specific sport. In many cases, 
assumptions are made and used for allocation purposes. As they point out, many 
revenue items are easy to allocate but other revenues require a predetermined allocation 
method. In Table 2, five revenue elements are allocated items. 
On the other hand, in order for the RCA to be effective, the costs included in the 
expense section of the budget must be all-inclusive.37 Strupeck et al. (1993) argue if the 
system truly is going to reflect a responsibility approach, costs must be assigned to the  
individual sports on a direct and indirect basis. At Georgia Tech, direct costs are defined 
as those expenses which are identifiable with a specific sport, such as the operating 
budget, recruiting, scholarships, and salaries. The above costs are allocated easily. Other 
direct expenses in Table 2 are not readily traceable and are allocated on a more 
subjective basis. Table 3 contains the expense category and basis for allocation for these 
direct costs. The decision to allocate rather than trace these costs was made to 
                                                          
36 C. David Strupeck, Ken Milani, and James E. Murphy. “Financial Management at Georgia Tech,” 
Management Accounting(February 1993), pp.58-63. 
37 C. David Strupeck, Ken Milani, and James E. Murphy. “Financial Management at Georgia Tech,” 
Management Accounting(February 1993), pp.58-63. 
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  <Table 2> Per Sport Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVENUE FOOTBALL BASKETBALL BASEBALL TRACK ALL OTHER TOTAL
Scholarship Fund 1,181,607       176,106              102,481        108,625     338,408         1,907,227      
Gen. Allocation-Contribution 708,883          287,325              77,194          30,596       196,002         1,300,000      
Sport Comm. Support 94,798          45,000           139,798         
Sinking Fund 450,000              450,000         
Conference Revenue Share 500,000          1,671,332           2,171,332      
Student Fee Allocation 248,274        114,090     713,326         1,075,690      
Ticket Sales 2,004,961       974,777              2,979,738      
Post Season Revenue 207,967              207,967         
Advertising & Prog. Sales 223,680          136,710              360,390         
Radio Rights 151,000          151,000              302,000         
Television Rights 100,000          100,000         
Facilities Rental 14,537            14,537           
Concessions 115,884          115,884         
Executive Suites 233,843          233,843         
Interest Income 37,752            15,302                4,111            1,629         10,438           69,232           
Miscellaneous 6,823              6,823             
Total Revenue 5,278,970       4,070,519           526,858        254,940     1,303,174      11,434,461    
EXPENSE DIRECT: FOOTBALL BASKETBALL BASEBALL TRACK ALL OTHER TOTAL
Operating Budget 744,305          366,144              109,666        50,395       315,086         1,585,596      
Recruting 568175 182357 34415 9112 66126 860,185         
Promotions 66253 10328 6057 82,638           
Scholarship Cost 1181607 176106 102481 108625 338408 1,907,227      
Salaries 627800 226200 82000 47350 264517 1,247,867      
Payroll Taxes 48782 17577 6372 3679 20554 96,964           
Band 28825 28825 57,650           
Cheerleaders 19800 19800 39,600           
Ticket Office 48317 48317 96,634           
Employee Benefits 99096 35705 12943 7474 41754 196,972         
Facility Loans 75288 653023 48228 65174 52792 894,505         
Capital Improvements 355258 355,258         
Telephone 52217 13054 6527 4351 32636 108,785         
Postage 34553 8638 4319 2879 21597 71,986           
Player Development 87458 87,458           
Pension Plan Premiums 27719 9987 3620 2091 11679 55,096           
Insurance 46455 4831 10034 16724 56489 134,533         
Total Direct Expenses 4,111,908       1,800,892           426,662        317,854     1,221,638      7,878,954      
EXPENSE INDIRECT: FOOTBALL BASKETBALL BASEBALL TRACK ALL OTHER TOTAL
Sports Medicine 147,162          15,305                31,787          52,978       178,949         426,181         
Facilities 762,208          308,939              83,001          32,897       210,747         1,397,792      
Sports Information 131,353          53,240                14,304          5,669         36,318           240,884         
Academic Center 94,412            9,819                  20,393          33,988       114,805         273,417         
Student-Athlete Program 1,675              174                     362               603            2,036             4,850             
Office Supplies 22,255            5,564                  2,782            1,855         13,908           46,364           
Audit & Legal 34,483            13,977                3,755            1,488         9,535             63,238           
Accounting Office 49,150            19,921                5,352            2,121         13,590           90,134           
Marketing Staff 41,006            16,621                4,465            1,770         11,338           75,200           
Administrative Staff:
        Salaries 236,440          95,834                25,747          10,205       65,374           433,600         
        Travel 49,435            20,037                5,383            2,134         13,669           90,658           
        Employee Benefits 123,256          49,958                13,422          5,320         34,080           226,036         
        Payroll Taxes 60,676            24,593                6,607            2,619         16,777           111,272         
        Pension Plan Premiums 34,476            13,974                3,754            1,488         9,533             63,225           
        Postage 47,889            19,411                5,215            2,067         13,241           87,823           
        Telephone 72,370            29,333                7,881            3,124         20,010           132,718         
        Miscellaneous 67,144            27,215                7,312            2,898         18,564           123,133         
Total Indirect Expenses 1,975,390       723,915              241,522        163,224     782,474         3,886,525      
TOTAL EXPENSES 6,087,298       2,524,807           668,184        481,078     2,004,112      11,765,479    
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SURPLUS (DEFICIT) (808,328) 1,545,712 (141,326) (226,138) (700,938) (331,018)
keep administrative costs reasonable. A sophisticated accounting system would be cost 
prohibitive, and many athletic program business departments are not equipped to trace 
items. In these cases, several general assumptions were made to ease the allocation 
process. 
Indirect costs are more difficult to grasp and allocate. They are not specifically 
identifiable with a sport, and the method of allocation is somewhat subjective and often 
arguable. A system of allocation and a defendable methodology are essential because 
many coaches have not had these costs associated with their specific programs. Also, 
Table 2 lists the indirect costs identified at Georgia Tech. These costs were allocated to 
each sport using a basis for allocation that was related the particular expense category. 
Table 3 lists the expenses and their respective bases for allocation. 
Once the coach as a decision maker and as manager of the athletic endeavor has 
been made aware of the total revenues and total costs being allocated to his/her program, 
he or she can think in terms of how much the program costs and the surplus or deficit 
generated from operating the program. In effect, the coach must act as an entrepreneur 
and manage his or her program costs more efficiently.38 As Strupeck et al. (1993) point 
out, the key to successful implementation of this responsibility center approach is to 
                                                          
38 C. David Strupeck, Ken Milani, and James E. Murphy. “Financial Management at Georgia Tech,” 
Management Accounting(February 1993), pp.58-63. 
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<Table 3> Allocated Direct and Indirect Costs at Georgia Tech 
DIRECT 
Expense  Basis for Allocation 
Payroll taxes  Salaries 
Employee benefits Salaries 
Telephone Size of coaching staff 
Postage Size of coaching staff 
Pension plan premiums Salaries 
Insurance Number of athletes 
 
INDIRECT 
Expense  Basis for Allocation 
Sports medicine  Number of student athletes 
Facilities % of operating budget 
Sports information % of operating budget  
Academic center Number of student athletes 
Number of student athletes 
Number of employees 
Student-athlete program 
Office supplies 
Audit & legal % of operating budget  
Accounting office % of operating budget  
Marketing staff % of operating budget  
Administrative staff % of operating budget  
 
control expenses. With an effective cost-per-sport analysis, the coach knows his or her 
total expenses including allocated overhead costs and must be allowed to manage this 
budget with the help of upper-level administrators.  
On the basis of the review of the responsibility center approach at George Tech, 
Strupeck et al. (1993) summarize the benefits of this approach into four components: 1) 
provides a look at all revenues and costs associated with a specific sports program , 2) 
provides substantial management information for more effective decision making, 3) 
provides a measurement technique, and 4) broaden coaches’ administrative abilities. 
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Also, they present the weaknesses in this approach as follows: 1) discontent with 
allocation of available revenue and the expenses incurred, 2) education process which 
substantial effort must be made to communicate and to explain the system, 3) continual 
refinement to be made reasonably over the period of years, and 4) real danger that many 
nonrevenue sports will continue to consider themselves as having second-class status.  
4-2. Limitations of Responsibility Accounting   
Although responsibility accounting system have contributed much to improving 
the management of operating costs and the measurement technique of divisional 
performance, it has limitations as follows:  
First, as reviewed in the case of Georgia Tech, in responsibility accounting the 
problem of unequal allocation of revenues and expenses arises and some divisional 
managers complain about the allocation methods. As Ostrenga (1990)39 holds, tracing 
costs directly to cost objects eliminates the need to allocate or assign costs. Thus, costs 
that cannot be charged directly should be assigned through activity-based costing.40 In 
practice, responsibility costs are specifically identified where possible and the 
remainder is allocated based on an estimate of usage.  
                                                          
39 Michael R. Ostrenga. “Activities: The Focal Point of Total Cost Management,” Management 
Accounting (February 1990), pp.42-49. 
40 Michael R. Ostrenga. “Activities: The Focal Point of Total Cost Management,” Management 
Accounting (February 1990), pp.42-49. 
34 
 
Second, whenever responsibility centers transfer goods or services among 
themselves or if there are important synergies among divisions, each of these internal 
transactions requires a transfer price in order to measure the performance of these 
business units. However, developing an accounting system capable of capturing all the 
synergic effects or coming up with appropriate transfer prices tends to be either 
impossible or, at best, a highly complicated and costly undertaking (Brickley et al., 
1995; Zimmerman, 1997). 
Next, responsibility accounting coupled with incentives to divisional managers to 
focus on only their division’s performance can also lead to behavior that, while 
increasing divisional profits, reduces the performance and value of the entire company. 
That is, divisional managers have incentives to pursue sub-optimal gaming strategies. 
Fourth, responsibility accounting like cost information systems such as Activity-
Based Costing (ABC) fails to account for the full cost of capital employed (Hubbell, 
1996a). Hubbell (1996a) 41  proposes cost information system methodologies be 
modified to include capital costs and capital drivers. The resulting improved cost 
management system helps managers’ focus on all the necessary elements of creating 
shareholder value, including both the management of costs and the management of 
                                                          
41 William W. Hubbell. “Combining Economic Value Added and Activity-Based Management,” Journal 
of Cost Management (Spring 1996), pp.18-29. 
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capital (Hubbell, 1996b). Therefore, this study presents the method of combining 
responsibility accounting with economic added value (EVA) in order to include the 
company’s most significant costs─the cost of financing the capital employed as 
responsibility accounting system as a cost management tool and a divisional 
performance measure fails to include the charge of capital employed. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
METHOD OF LINKING RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING TO 
EVA FOR MEASURING DIVISIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
1. Basic Concept and Definition of EVA 
Residual Income   
42    Residual income and economic profits  have been created by economists and 
managerial accountants. The financial accountant, in contrast, speaks only of accounting 
profits (Martin and Petty, 2000). According to them43, for the financial accountant, 
profits are measured as revenues less operating expenses less the cost of debt financing 
in the form of interest expense. The only financing cost is interest expense. Thus, there 
is no cost for equity capital. However, for economists, true profits come after 
subtracting all financing costs, both for debt and equity capital, where cost is defined as 
the opportunity cost of the funds if they were to be invested in another firm of similar 
risk. Thus, 
Accounting Cost of Operating Interest = Sales - - - - Taxes
Profits Goods sold expenses expenses 
Economic Cost of Operating Charge for all
= Sales - - - Taxes - 
Profits Goods sold expenses capital used 
                                                          
42 John D. Martin and J. William Petty (2000) used the two terms interchangeably. 
43 John D. Martin and J. William Petty. Value Based Management: The Corporate Response to the Share -
holder Revolution. Harvard Business School Press, 2000, pp.80-81. 
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On the basis of the formulas above, for the economists, the traditional accounting profits 
metric does not completely measure a firm’s profits.  
Market Value Added (MVA) 
     Basic corporate finance and microeconomic theory tells us that the prime 
financial directive of any firm ought to be to maximize the wealth of its shareholders 
(Stewart Ⅲ, 1994).  Stewart Ⅲ (1994)44 argued this objective not only serves the 
interests of the firm s owners; it is also the rule that ensures that scarce resources of all 
kinds are allocated, managed, and redeployed as efficiently as possible. Also, he holds 
that shareholders wealth is maximized only by maximizing the difference between the 
firm’s total value and the total capital that investors have committed to it (Stewart Ⅲ,  
1994). This difference is called Market Value Added (MVA), which represents the 
spread between the cash that the firm’s investors have put into the business since the 
inception of the company and the present value of the cash they could get out of it 
(Stewart Ⅲ, 1994; Dierks and Patel, 1997; Epstein and Young, 1999). Therefore, 
MVA = Total Value – Total Capital 
 Stewart Ⅲ (1994) holds managers can achieve their goal of maximizing MVA 
and the wealth of the shareholders through a well-established decision-making rule.  
                                                          
44 G. Bennett Stewart Ⅲ. “EVATM : Fact and Fantasy,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance(Summer 
1994), pp.71-84. 
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He portrays that rule as taking those actions and adopting those strategies that are 
expected to maximize the net present value, or NPV, of future cash flows.  
   A company’ s MVA is a cumulative measure of the wealth a firm has created for its 
investors and communicates the market s present verdict on the NPV of all its current 
and contemplated capital investments (Stewart Ⅲ, 1994; Dierks and Patel, 1997). If 
MVA is positive number, the company has made its shareholder richer. A negative 
MVA indicates how much shareholder wealth has been destroyed.45 Thus, as Stewart 
Ⅲ argues, MVA is a significant summary assessment of corporate performance-one 
that shows how successful a company has been in allocating, managing, and 
redeploying scarce resources to maximize the NPV of the enterprise and, thereby, the 
wealth of its shareholders. 
Economic Value Added (EVA) 
46Stewart Ⅲ (1991)  defines EVA as the one measure that properly accounts for all 
the complex trade-offs involved in creating value. As described by Dierks and Patel 
(1997), EVA is a measure of financial performance that combines the familiar concept 
of residual income with principles of modern corporate finance.  
                                                          
45 Paul A. Dierks, and Ajay Patel. “What is EVA, and How Can It Help Your Company?,” Management 
Accounting (November 1997), pp.52-58. 
46 G. Bennett Stewart, Ⅲ. The Quest for Value : The EVA Management Guide. Harper Business, 1991, 
pp.136.  
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47Biddle et al. (1999)  depicts the steps that transform underlying cash flows from 
operations (CFO) into economic value added (EVA) in Figure 4. 
<Figure 4> Relations Between Financial Measures 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First introduced in the late 1980s, EVA is computed by taking the spread between 
the rate of return on capital r and the cost of capital c* and then multiplying by the 
economic book value of the capital committed to the business (Stewart Ⅲ, 1991; 
Dierks and Patel, 1997). In formula form, 
EVA = (r - c*) × Capital; 
Where r = rate of return; and 
c* = cost of capital, or the weighted average cost of capital 
                                                          
47 Garry. C. Biddle, Robert M. Bowen, and James S. Wallace. “Evidence on EVA,” Journal of Applied 
Corporate Finance(Summer 1999), pp.69-79. 
EVA = CFO + Accruals ATInt - CapChg AccAdj  + +
  Net Income (NI)       
           
  Net Operating Profits After Tax     
           
  Residual Income (RI)   
           
  Economic Value Added (EVA) 
 
▪  CFO: cash flow from operations 
▪  ATInt: after-tax interest 
▪  CapChg : charge for the estimated current cost of debt and equity capital 
▪  AccAdj: Accounting adjustments to NOPAT and Capital   
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Then, EVA = (r × Capital) – (c* × Capital); 
EVA = NOPAT – c* × Capital; and 
EVA = operating profits – a capital charge 
According to Stewart Ⅲ (1991) and Dierks and Patel (1997), key components of 
EVA are NOPAT and the capital charge. NOPAT is profits derived from a company’s 
operations after taxes but before financing costs and noncash-bookkeeping entries. It is 
the total pool of profits available to provide a cash return to those who provided capital 
to the firm.  
The capital charge is the cash flow required to compensate investors for the 
riskiness of the business given the amount of capital invested and the cost of capital is 
the minimum rate of return on capital required to compensate debt and equity investors 
for bearing risk to create value (Stewart Ⅲ, 1991; Dierks and Patel, 1997). 
As we discussed earlier, EVA is not a new technique. However, Zimmerman 
(1997)48 points out EVA differs from residual income in three ways: 
▪ First, EVA makes use of principles and methods of modern financial economics to 
provide a more accurate measure of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). 
▪ Second, instead of using earnings as computed under Generally Accepted Accounting 
                                                          
48 Jerold L. Zimmerman. “EVA and Divisional Performance Measurement: Capturing Synergies and 
Other Issues,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance(Summer 1997), pp.99-109. 
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Procedures (GAAP), they are encouraged to undo certain GAAP procedures that create 
incentives to take decisions that reduce value. 
▪ Third, most EVA implementations do not stop at changing the firm’s performance 
measurement scheme but go farther and often recommend wholesale changes in its 
compensation packages. 
2. Usefulness of EVA as a Performance Measure 
Benefits of EVA 
As Joel Stern is quick to say, “Anyone can compute a firm s EVA, but it s how 
EVA is used that makes the difference.”49 Based on the arguments of Stewart Ⅲ 
(1991) and Ehrbar (1998), Martin and Petty (2000)50 presents four benefits of EVA as a 
financial management system within the organization as follows: 
▪  EVA relies on a new and improved measurement of return on invested capital, 
removing the distorted economic information about the firm and the misleading of 
management and investors about the financial results.  
▪  EVA provides a new and improved criterion for evaluating a firm’s operating and 
strategic decisions. 
▪  EVA, combined with the right bonus plan, can instill a sense of urgency along with 
                                                          
49 John D. Martin and J. William Petty. Value Based Management: The Corporate Response to the Share -
holder Revolution. Harvard Business School Press, 2000, pp.103-104. 
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an owner’s perspective.  
▪  An EVA system can change a corporate culture by facilitating communications and 
cooperation among divisions and departments. 
As a consequence, as argued by Martin and Petty (2000), EVA is intended to 
provide the right management incentives to change behavior, including how capital is 
utilized, rather than just serving as a tool of financial analysis. 
Evidence on EVA 
51Wallace’s (1997)  research provides independent evidence on the claim: EVA 
better motivates managers to increase shareholder wealth. As shown in Figure 5, 
independent evidence suggests that firms adopting residual income-based incentives 
tend to (1) improve operating efficiency by increasing asset turnover, (2) dispose of 
selected assets and reduce new investment, and (3) repurchase more shares. Also, the 
evidence reveals that firms adopting RI incentive plans exhibit increased residual 
income (Biddle et al., 1999). 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
50 Op.cit., pp.104. 
51 James S. Wallace. “Adopting Residual-Income-Based Compensation Plans: Do You Get What You Pay 
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<Figure 5> Incentive Effects Following Adoption of RI Based Compensation Plans 
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3. Measurement of a Firm’s EVA 
EVA is a measure of financial performance that combines the familiar concept of 
residual income with principles of modern corporate finance-specifically, that all 
capital has a cost and that earning more than the cost of capital creates value for 
shareholders. In summary, it is a true economic profit consisting of all costs including 
the cost of capital. Key components of EVA are NOPAT and the capital charge. 
Calculating NOPAT and Invested Capital   
A firm’s NOPAT and CAPITAL is calculated after making the necessary 
                                                                                                                                                                          
For?,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance(December 1997), pp.275-300. 
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adjustments of the data reported by a conventional financial accounting system.  
52According to Stewart Ⅲ (1991) , a firm’s EVA is calculated in two ways: an 
Operating Approach and a Financing Approach. To understand how these approaches 
work, we first must understand the concepts of equity equivalent reserves. Equity 
equivalents are adjustments that a firm’s accounting book value into economic book 
value. In this way, capital-related items are turned into a more accurate measure of 
invested capital and also, revenue- and expense-related equity equivalent adjustments 
are included in NOPAT which is a more realistic measure of the actual cash yield from 
generated from recurring business activities. 
53According to Martin and Petty (2000) , there are only three reasons for making 
adjustments: 1) To convert from accrual to cash accounting, 2) To capitalize market-
building expenditures that have been expensed in the past, and 3) To remove cumulative 
unusual losses or gains after taxes. 
54Stewart Ⅲ (1994)  identifies a total of 164 equity equivalent reserve adjustments; 
however, only some 20 to 25 have to be addressed in detail, and as few as 5 to 10 key 
adjustments are actually made in practice. In order to decide when an adjustment should 
                                                          
52 G. Bennett Stewart Ⅲ. The Quest for Value : The EVA Management Guide. Harper Business, 1991, 
pp.87-110. 
53 John D. Martin and J. William Petty. Value Based Management: The Corporate Response to the Share -
holder Revolution. Harvard Business School Press, 2000, pp.90-91. 
54 G. Bennett Stewart Ⅲ. “EVATM : Fact and Fantasy,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance(Summer 
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be made, he recommends making adjustments only in cases that pass four tests: 1) Is it 
likely to have a material impact on EVA?, 2) Can the managers influence the outcome? 
3) Can the operating people readily grasp it?, and 4) Is the required information 
relatively easy to track and derive? 
As discussed above, there are two equivalent approaches─from a financing perspective 
and from an operating perspective─for calculating NOPAT and CAPITAL. Martin and 
Petty (2000) provide a framework for computing NOPAT and CAPITAL and claim that 
while they cannot include all the possible adjustments to be made, those shown in 
appendix A represent important ones in most cases (see the table in appendix A). 
Estimating the Cost of Capital   
As discussed earlier, the cost of capital is the minimum rate of return on capital 
required to compensate debt and equity investors for bearing risk to create value.55 EVA 
makes use of principles and methods of modern financial economics to provide a more 
accurate measure of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) (Stewart Ⅲ, 1991; 
Zimmerman, 1997). From the financing perspective, WACC is computed by weighting 
the individual costs of debt and equity by the proportions each financing form 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1994), pp.71-84. 
55 Paul A. Dierks, and Ajay Patel. “What is EVA, and How Can It Help Your Company?,” Management 
Accounting (November 1997), pp.52-58. 
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56represents in the target capital structure:
(1) (2)  (3) = (1) × (2) 
After-Tax Target Weighted 
Cost Percent Cost 
(1 – t)b × D/cap (1 – t) b Debt Debt / capital 
y × E/cap y Equity Equity / capital 
Weighted average =  Sum of weighted costs 
cost of capital 
(WACC) 
 
    Based on this approach, as argued by Stewart Ⅲ (1991), the cost of capital is the 
return that must be earned on total capital employed in order to have funds sufficient to 
pay interest after taxes on the debt and have enough left over to provide an acceptable 
return on equity.   
     In the formula above, the cost of debt, verified more easily, is the rate that a 
company would have to pay in the current market to obtain new long-term debt capital 
and its best indication is the prevailing yield to maturity on the firm’s own outstanding 
and publicly traded debt (Stewart Ⅲ, 1991; Koller et al., 2005). In the absence of a 
quote for its bonds, a company’s borrowing rate could be approximated by the rate of 
currently being paid by a sample of companies with the same bond rating.57
                                                          
56 G. Bennett Stewart Ⅲ. The Quest for Value : The EVA Management Guide. Harper Business, 1991, 
pp.433-434. 
57 Op.cit., pp.434. 
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     On the other hand, a company’s cost of equity is more abstract because it is not a 
readily observable cash-to-cash yield but an opportunity cost to the total return that a 
company s investors could expect to earn from alternative investments of comparable 
risk (Stewart Ⅲ, 1991). The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) provides a 
conceptual framework for determining the expected return on common stocks, and it 
can be used to estimate firms’ cost of capital.58 Thus, the company’s cost of capital is 
expressed as follows: 
kE = R  + ß  (Rf s m – R ) f
where 
kE = firm s cost of equity capital 
Rf = risk-free rate 
ßs = beta of the firm’s stock 
= cost of equity for the market as a whole Rm 
Therefore, in order to estimate k we need estimates of R , the risk-free rate; RE f M, 
the expected return on the market as a whole; and ßs, the level of systematic risk 
associated with the firm’s stock. As Koller et al. (2005)59 describe, R  can be estimated f
                                                          
58 Diversification, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and the Cost of Equity Capital Case, #9-276-183, 
Harvard Business School, 1993, pp.9. 
59 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2005, pp.296-297. 
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as the average or expected rate of return on Treasury bills in the future and the market 
risk premium is the difference between the return on the market, Rm, and the risk-free 
rate, R . Also, the stock’s beta, ßf s, can be estimated by linear regression. In practice 
betas are available from many brokerage firms and investment advisory services.60
4. Combing Responsibility Accounting and EVA 
4-1. Need for Linking Responsibility Accounting to EVA   
Creating economic value for shareholders, customers, and employees is the basic 
purpose of any corporation (Hubbell, 1996b). This requires allocating, managing, and 
redeploying scarce capital to its most profitable use.61  
As Hubbell (1996a) holds, for internal management information systems to serve 
the best interests of both shareholders and managers, they must identify, collect, and 
routinely report the information that is critical to making decisions about resource 
allocations. Also, Cooper and Kaplan (1988)62  emphasize the importance of cost 
information system, which provides more accurate information about production and 
support activities and product costs so that management can focus its attention on the 
products and processes with the most leverage for increasing profits. 
                                                          
60 Diversification, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and the Cost of Equity Capital Case, #9-276-183, 
Harvard Business School, 1993, pp.9. 
61 William W. Hubbell. “Combining Economic Value Added and Activity-Based Management,” Journal 
of Cost Management (Spring 1996), pp.18-29. 
62 Robin Cooper and Robert S. Kaplan. “Measure Costs Right : Make the Right Decisions,” Harvard 
Business Review (September-October 1988), pp.96-103. 
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Responsibility accounting system in which controllable costs should be 
attributed directly, assigned, and allocated to responsibility centers have proved their 
usefulness in controlling costs, reporting on critical divisional financial performance, 
and motivating the managers of responsibility centers. Although responsibility 
accounting have contributed much to improving the management of operating costs, it 
failed to consider the balance sheet and then to account for the full cost of capital. That 
is, while cost systems including ABC focus management’s attention on cost drivers as 
the means to managing costs, they do not identify critical capital drivers a means of 
managing capital (Hubbell, 1996a). Thus, the methodologies of responsibility 
accounting system need to be modified to include one of the company’s most significant 
costs–the cost of financing the capital employed (Hubbell, 1996a).        
On the other hand, as discussed earlier, EVA is one of the best measures of 
shareholder economic value and also, the financial management tool for organizational 
profitability measurement within the organization, including the cost of capital 
employed (Uyemura et al., 1996).  
Under such circumstances, companies need to seriously consider integrating 
their responsibility accounting systems with EVA. In order to link responsibility 
accounting to EVA, companies must add capital charges to operating expenses. These 
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capital charges can be traced to responsibility centers by means of cost methodology. 
 Several benefits to combining responsibility accounting and EVA are summarized 
as follows: 1) shared costs and assets traced to responsibility centers, 2) asset 
management improved by focusing on capital drivers, 3) cost information which reflects 
all costs, including capital charges, 4) operating managers better understanding of how 
they can help create EVA, 5) setting priorities for investments in new technology and 
continuous improvement initiatives, and 6) identification of the most appropriate EVA 
centers (Hubbell, 1996a; Uyemura et al., 1996). 
As a result, the resulting integrated cost system provides managers with a total 
governance system for improving processes, managing both costs and capital, and 
creating shareholder value. 
4-2. Method of Combining Responsibility Accounting and EVA   
Responsibility costs are traced to responsibility centers through cost methodology 
shown in Figure 6. To establish the integrated cost system mentioned above, as Figure 7 
shows from the perspective of Activity-Based Costing (ABC), responsibility costing can 
be amended to include a capital charge. The capital charges calculated using the balance 
sheet and the cost of capital must be added to the operating expenses from the general 
ledger and also, the cost drivers and capital drivers must be used as shown in Figure 7 
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<Figure 6> Cost Methodology and Sequence Preference 
 
COST ACCOUNT  
 
 
DIRECT 
ATTRIBUTION 
ASSIGNED 
THROUGH 
DRIVERS 
ALLOCATED 
 
 
RESPONSIBILITY CENTERS 
1 2 3 … 22 23 24  
 
  First Preference 
  Second Preference 
  Last Resort 
 
 Source: Reproduced from Michael R. Ostrenga, Activities: The Focal Point of 
Total Cost Management, Management Accounting (February 1990), pp.42-49. 
 
(Hubbell, 1996a). Then, all the costs including both operating expenses and capital 
charges must be traced to cost objects. As a consequence, it becomes apparent which 
business units contribute to EVA, not just operating profit (Hubbell, 1996b). 
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<Figure 7> Linking EVA to Responsibility Accounting through ABC  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CASE STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 
 
In order to approach to the model on linking the responsibility center accounting 
to EVA in a more objective and accurate way, the various literature research and reports, 
academic books related to the management accounting and financial management are 
reviewed above.  
KTO (Korea Tourism Organization) is the object of the case study for 
computation and analysis of divisional financial performance, from 2003 to 2005. In 
this case study, the introduction method of combining responsibility accounting and 
EVA was examined. A lot of financial data and business information will be obtained 
through the KTO and classified by business segment in order to build the advanced 
model for measuring the results more accurately. 
 
1. Overview of the KTO 
1-1. History and Development 
    The Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) began in 1962 as a government-owned 
corporation responsible for the Korean Tourism industry. The corporation has 
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concentrated primarily on the promotion of Korea as a tourist destination and has 
contributed significantly to attracting foreign tourists. 
    Starting in the 1980s, domestic tourism promotion also came to be an important 
function of the KTO. Public tourism demand has been going up due to an improved 
standard of living and increased disposable income, as well as an enhanced 
transportation network. The KTO continues to help develop tourism within Korea 
through addressing current trends in the tourism industry. 
Inbound visitors amounted to over 6 million in 2005, and the tourism industry is 
playing a more and more important role in the Korean economy. 
 In response to such circumstances, the KTO is endeavoring to develop Korean 
traditional culture into high-quality tourism products and tourism resources, in 
conjunction with local governments and the tourism industry. To improve tourism 
transportation, accommodation infrastructure, tourist information systems, and overall 
service, the company is also working to eliminate undesirable aspects of the tourism 
atmosphere through various public campaigns. Also, the KTO is endeavoring to make 
Korea as a worldwide attractive tourism destination, play a pivotal role in the 
developing in the Korean tourism industry as a national strategic industry, and 
strengthen Korea’s competitiveness through focusing on major strengths and utilizing 
55 
 
expert knowledge.  
1-2. Business Activity and Financial Results 
    The organization’s major functions are divided into as follows: 1) Overseas 
tourism promotion, 2) Korea convention bureau & its activities, 3) Tourist information 
services, 4) Cooperation with the local government & the tourism industry, 5) Local 
tourism promotion & improvements in the tourism environment, 6) Tourism exchanges 
between South & North Korea, 7) Resort development & consulting, and 8) Activities 
for raising funds for tourism promotion. In Table 4, the company’s major business 
functions and business activities are shown in more detail. KTO reshuffled its 
organizational structure into 6 divisions in 2005.  
Financial history of the KTO for the years 2003 through 2005 is shown in Table 5 
through Table 7. Table 5 presents the KTO’s income statements for the 3-year period 
from 2003 to 2005. The KTO posted continuous increases in revenues over the entire 
period. The KTO’s 2005 profits were ₩5,952 million on sales of ₩361.9 billion. Sales 
and net income have grown at 3-year average annual growth rates of 6.8 % and 79.8 %, 
respectively. Concurrently, the KTO maintained margins with average gross profit, 
operating income, and net margins of 38.9 %, -0.9 % and 0.9 %, respectively.  
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<Table 4> KTO Major Business Functions and Activities  
 
BUSINESS FUNCTIONS BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
Overseas Tourism Promotion • Devising marketing strategies, Planning inbound 
tourism products, and Attracting foreign schools 
& incentive trips 
• Familiarization tours and Overseas advertising 
• Performing research, Publishing promotional 
materials in foreign languages and monthly &  
yearly reports of tourism statistics, and so on 
Korea Convention Bureau & 
its Activities 
• Conducting a campaign for holding international 
  conventions and Holding big events 
• One-stop service for planning and staging intl. 
  Conventions and Cooperative activities with 
  International organizations 
Tourist Information Services • Operating Tourist information center, Providing 
24 hr. travel information service (dial 1330) 
• Promotion thru. internet website (Tour2Korea) 
Cooperation with the Local 
Govt. & the Tourism Industry 
• Establishing on-line network between KTO and 
local govt., Operating educational program for 
local public servants, and so on 
• Supporting mega-events and festivals in Korea 
Local Tourism Promotion & 
Improvements in the Tourism 
Environment 
• Promoting local tourist attraction,Conducting 
See Korea First Campaign, Improving tourism  
environment, and Korea Travel Card 
Tourism Exchanges between 
South & North Korea 
• Running tourism businesses in NK, Supporting for 
  inter-Korean exchange events 
• Collection and analysis of tourism information  
about North Korea 
Resort Development &  
Consulting 
• Development of resort areas by KTO (Jeju, Haenam,
Gyeongju, etc.)  
• Assistance to local govt.s in tourism development 
Activities for Raising Funds 
For Tourism Promotion 
• Operating duty free shops (Intl. airports & seaports) 
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Annual return on equity averaged 1.0 % and return on assets averaged -0.6 %. 
Over this same period, KTO’s liquidity situation was comfortable, as indicated by a 
average current ratio of 229.5 %. And annual debt to equity ratio averaged 41.9 %.  
<Table 5> KTO Consolidated Income Statements and Key Financial Ratios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(KRW amounts in millions) 2005 2004 2003
Revenues 361,924   340,303   280,206   
   Net sales 269,430   261,833   222,019   
   Other income 92,494     78,470     58,187     
Cost of goods sold 221,702   210,245   168,996   
   Gross margin 140,222   130,058   111,210   
Operating expenses:
   Wages, salaries and benefits 31,581     29,552     28,117     
   Depreciation and amortization 9,689       8,529       9,059       
   Rentals 71,878     65,831     57,726     
   Selling expenses 8,290       8,084       5,985       
  Other operating expenses 16,705     20,041     18,275     
   Total Operating Expenses 138,143   132,037   119,162   
   Operating Income 2,079       (1,979) (7,952)
   Income before taxes and extraordinary loss 1,289       2,289       3,318       
   Provision for income taxes (4,663) 1,064       1,255       
   Net Income 5,952       1,225       2,063       
Year Ended December 31
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 2004 2003 3-Yr Avg
Selected Growth Rate and Ratios
   Sales Growth 6.4% 21.4% -7.3% 6.8%
   Net Income Growth 281.8% -24.4% -18.0% 79.8%
   Growth Profit Margin 38.7% 38.2% 39.7% 38.9%
   Operating Margin 0.6% -0.6% -2.8% -0.9%
   Net Margin 1.6% 0.4% 0.7% 0.9%
   Return on Assets 0.4% -0.4% -1.8% -0.6%
  Return on Equity 1.9% 0.4% 0.7% 1.0%
   Current Ratio 222.4% 189.5% 276.7% 229.5%
   Debt to Equity 55.0% 39.4% 31.4% 41.9%
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<Table 6> KTO Consolidated Balance Sheets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(KRW amounts in millions) 2005 2004 2003
ASSETS
Current Assets
  Cash and cash equivalents 11,309       6,557       3,080       
  Short-term investments 10,743       10,971     5,338       
  Accounts receivable 5,136         5,230       3,252       
  Prepaid expenses 3,473         4,012       4,470       
  Inventories 86,391       86,675     95,527     
  Other current assets 6,128         6,225       5,557       
     Total current assets 123,180     119,670   117,224   
  Investments 161,871     138,597   116,855   
  Property, plant and equipment, net 222,175     194,084   174,804   
  Intangible assets, net 53,869       57,077     59,272     
     Total assets 561,095     509,428   468,155   
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY
Current Liabilities
  Accounts payable 8,459         8,020       8,323       
  Short-term borrowings 22,000       26,000     15,000     
  Accrued liabilities 14,392       18,478     13,339     
  Accrued interest 1,344         24            24            
  Advance 3,935         3,995       1,646       
  Other current liabilities 5,252         6,637       4,036       
     Total current liabilities 55,382       63,154     42,368     
  Long-term debt 154,000     99,000     84,400     
  Retirement allowance 8,575         5,150       3,222       
  Rental deposit 20,457       20,629     19,530     
  Other liabilities -                 4,051       2,104       
Shareholders' Equity
  Common stock 32,391       32,391     32,391     
  Additional paid in capital 1,835         1,835       1,835       
  Retained earnings 288,677     283,211   282,299   
  Recapitalization (222) 7              6          
     Total shareholders' equity 322,681     317,444   316,531   
     Total liabilities and shareholders' equity 561,095     509,428   468,155   
Year Ended December 31
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1-3. KTO’s Past Financial Performance by Business Segment 
<Table 7> Financial Summary by Business Segment, 2003-2005 (millions of KRW) 
2005 2004 2003
Tourism Promotion
Sales 71,941 58,428 42,147
Cost of sales 67,222 54,726 39,823
Gross profit 4,719 3,702 2,324
Operating expenses 32,852 36,455 32,732
Operating profit (28,133) (32,753) (30,408)
Total assets 546,384 487,008 447,923
Duty-free Shops
Sales 275,619 249,198 212,164
Cost of sales 150,703 143,247 124,427
Gross profit 124,916 105,951 87,737
Operating expenses 94,489 85,218 77,180
Operating profit 30,427 20,733 10,557
Total assets 60,480 72,364 72,450
Jeju Office
  Golf Club
Sales 9,737 9,475 9,304
Cost of sales 1,235 1,880 1,316
Gross profit 8,502 7,595 7,988
Operating expenses 6,429 6,019 5,361
Operating profit 2,073 1,576 2,627
  Resort Development
Sales 4,579 23,202 16,591
Cost of sales 2,492 10,391 3,430
Gross profit 2,087 12,811 13,161
Operating expenses 4,172 4,111 3,889
Operating profit (2,085) 8,700 9,272
Total assets 112,423 115,748 121,072
Seonam Office
  Resort Development
Sales 49 0 0
Cost of sales 51 0 0
Gross profit (2) 0 0
Operating expenses 200 233 0
Operating profit (202) (233) 0
Total assets 111,779 84,316 69,142
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The KTO has four major lines of business: tourism promotion, resort development, 
duty-free shops, and golf club. Table 7 summarizes its line-of-business data. 
Tourism promotion includes 21 divisions(departments and teams), with 23 
overseas offices and 5 regional promotion offices. Tourism generated 19.9% of 2005 
sales and 23.8% of operating expenses.      
Duty-free shops are operated at 3 international airports and 6 seaports throughout 
the country. Duty-free shops produced 76.2% of 2005 sales and 68.4% of operating 
expenses. 
Operating duty-free shops has been a oligopolistic business with intense competition 
from other private companies such as Lotte, AK, and DFS since the demonopolization 
of Korean government in 2001.    
Resort development encompasses resort areas developed by KTO: Jungmun resort 
in Jeju and Hwawon resort in Haenam. Resort development provided 1.3% of 2005 
sales and 3.2% of operating expenses.     
2. Responsibility Accounting Model Currently Applied in the KTO 
Inasmuch as the backbone of any responsibility accounting is the organization 
chart of the company, the organization chart of the KTO is presented first to describe its 
current responsibility accounting in Figure 8. This organization chart shows a chief 
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executive officer (CEO) and six vice presidents to head up the basic divisions of the 
KTO: management, marketing, investment & development, tourism technology, e-
tourism, and business development. Each vice president in charge of divisions has many 
responsibility centers (e.g., department, team, bureau, center, and so on) whose 
managers has control over cost, revenue, and investments in operating assets. Also 
indicated are the business units above responsible directly or indirectly to each vice 
president in charge of them. 
2-1. Introduction of the KTO’s Responsibility Accounting Method 
Establishing of Responsibility Centers   
As shown in Table 8, Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) categorizes its six 
divisions and one department into cost centers, profit centers, and investment centers 
depending on the responsibilities of the managers of the segments. In addition, the KTO 
builds the business units of which divisions are composed as responsibility centers on 
the basis of its levels of responsibility. 
A partial organization chart for vice president investment & development 
appears in Figure 9. This partial organization chart indicates how the various business 
units of the company are classified in terms of responsibility.
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<Figure 8> Organization Chart  
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 <Table 8> Divisions Classified as Cost, Profit, and Investment Centers 
Responsibility Divisions Related Business Functions  Centers 
Vice President for Cost center • Support to the company’s 
Management   operating units 
Vice President for Profit center • Overseas tourism promotion 
Marketing • Local tourism promotion 
• Korea convention bureau & 
  its activities 
Vice President for Investment • Cooperation with the local 
Investment &  center govt. & tourism industry 
Development • Tourism exchanges between 
  South & North Korea 
• Resort development & 
consulting 
Vice President for Profit center • Research and survey for  
Tourism Technology tourism promotion 
Vice President for Profit center • Information technology 
E-Tourism planning, development, and 
  operation 
Vice President for Investment • Operating duty-free shops & 
Business Development center   Korea travel card (KTC) 
Public Relations  Cost center • Performing public relations 
Department for enhancing corporate 
image 
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<Figure 9> Business Units Classified as Cost, Profit, and Investment Centers 
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Responsibility Costing   
As discussed earlier, responsibility accounting system in which costs should be 
attributed directly, assigned, and allocated to responsibility centers have proved their 
usefulness in controlling costs, reporting on critical divisional financial performance, 
and motivating the managers of responsibility centers. Therefore, in order to more 
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accurately measure the performance of responsibility centers and control their costs for 
enhancing the KTO corporate value, it requires more appropriate responsibility costing 
system which segregates costs attributable to the responsibility centers from costs that 
are not.  
The KTO like most modern large organizations has both operating departments 
and support departments (service departments). The central purposes of the KTO are 
carried out in the operating departments: marketing planning team, Korea convention 
bureau, Korea tourism investment center, Korea travel card, and so on. In contrast, 
support departments provide services or assistance to the operating departments. 
Examples of support departments include finance & accounting team, human resources 
team, budgeting team, and general affairs team. The costs incurred by its’ support 
departments are usually allocated to its, operating departments through the cost 
allocation method selected. The costs allocation method selected by the KTO is 
illustrated in Figure 10. As the first step in Figure 10 indicates, only the traceable costs 
are charged to the teams which consume corporate resources. If a cost is not traceable to 
a team, then it is not assigned to the team. In the second step, the corporate overhead 
costs are assigned through more than one driver by account which should drive those 
costs.  
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 <Figure 10> Cost Allocation Method for Responsibility Costs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collection of Direct 
Costs by Team 
Assignment of Common
Costs managed by one 
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2nd Step 
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4th Step 
For example, the number of employees is used as the driver for employee social 
insurance expenses because the costs incurred in the human resources team are driven to 
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a large extent by the number of beneficiaries.  
<Table 9> Cost Allocation Bases 
Panel A. Cost Allocation Bases for Corporate Overhead Costs managed by one team 
Example of Costs   Basis for Allocation Related Team 
Medical checkup 
Athletic meeting 
Social insurance expenses 
Telephone charges 
Electric charges 
Water rates 
Natural gas charges 
Office and IT supplies 
Uniform 
Information systems  
maintenance & repair 
Training 
 Percentage of salaries  
Number of employees  
Percentage of salaries 
Number of employees  
Square footage occupied 
Number of employees 
Square footage occupied   
Number of employees   
Number of salespersons 
Number of employees 
  
Number of employees 
(excluding temp. employees)
Human Resources  
Human Resources 
Human Resources 
General Affairs 
General Affairs 
General Affairs  
General Affairs  
General Affairs  
Planning & Promotion 
Information Systems 
Operation 
Human Resources 
 
Panel B. Cost Allocation Bases for Support Departments 
Support Department Basis for Allocation Cost Object 
Office of Audit 
Secretariat 
Planning and Coordination 
Budgeting 
General Affairs 
Human Resources 
Finance & Accounting 
Legal Affairs 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Each team in six divisions 
Overseas Marketing Support  
Tourism Complex Development 
Duty-Free Business 
Planning and Promotion 
Purchasing 
Number of employees 
Number of employees  
Revenues 
Revenues 
Revenues 
Each team in a specific 
business unit involved 
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Then allocation of corporate overhead costs and division/department/team common 
costs to operating teams is illustrated in the third step and the fourth step in Figure 9.  
These costs are allocated to teams using allocation bases selected. In Table 9, Panel A 
presents the cost-allocation bases of common costs managed by a specific team for its 
efficient control. Examples of allocation bases for some support departments are listed 
in Panel B.  
Responsibility Reporting   
A different kind of financial statement is required for evaluating the performance 
of a responsibility center that emphasizes segments rather than the performance of the 
company as a whole. In Figure 11, the three levels of responsibility reporting in the 
partial organization have been indicated and numbered. These levels are applicable to 
other divisions in the organization. That is, these constructs tend to emphasize the 
parallel relationship of the levels of responsibility and the reports which are directed at 
each of the levels and serve as an anchor chart in that it will enable one to refer back to 
this as individual responsibility centers, reporting is discussed through the various levels 
of responsibility. Under the responsibility accounting system, the KTO focuses attention 
on the first level of responsibility reporting to more appropriately evaluate the 
performance of the responsibility centers in the division. 
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<Figure 11> Levels of Responsibility Reporting 
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 Segmented Financial Statements   
A portion of the segmented report by responsibility centers in the division is shown 
in Table 10. Immediately to the right the column listing accounts are four 
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columns―one for each of the four responsibility centers. In order to prepare an income 
statement for a particular responsibility center, as illustrated in Table 10, the segment 
margin is obtained by deducting the operating expenses of a responsibility center from 
the responsibility center’s gross profit. The operating expenses are directly traced to 
individual responsibility centers. In the next step, support costs in the division are 
allocated through allocation bases to yield the contribution margin 1.  
 <Table 10> Segmented Income Statements by Responsibility Centers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Events Team Incheon Airport Jungmun Beach Jeju Office
(KRW amounts in millions) Duty-Free Shop Golf Club
Revenues -                  114,462         9,304            16,591          
   Net sales -                  109,710         -                    15,880          
   Other income -                  4,752             9,304            711               
Cost of goods sold 570             62,817           1,318            3,428            
   Gross profit (570) 51,645 7,986 13,163
Operating expenses:
   Salaries 412             3,897             2,488            865               
   Rent expense -                  29,064           2                   12                 
   Depreciation -                  556                298               487               
   Selling expenses -                  2,760             303               -                   
   Other operating expenses 35               1,120             2,270            2,525            
   Total Operating Expenses 447             37,397           5,361            3,889            
Segment Margin (1,017) 14,248 2,625 9,274
Allocated Support Dept. Costs -                  1,078             161               161-               
Contribution Margin 1 (1,017) 13,170 2,464 9,435
Allocated Corp. Overhead Costs 430             383                385               202               
Contribution Margin 2 (1,447) 12,787 2,079 9,233
Responsibility Centers
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Finally, some corporate overhead costs such as medical checkup and athletic meeting 
are directly assigned to individual centers and others are allocated to them using 
allocation bases. These procedures generate the contribution margin 2. 
2-2. Problems of Existing Responsibility Accounting System in KTO 
As discussed above, the KTO establishes three types of responsibility center and 
measures the responsibility costs consumed by responsibility center. However, the 
current responsibility accounting system in the KTO has problems to be solved so as to 
measure the responsibility costs more accurately and objectively. They are as follows: 
First, for the accurate classification of responsibility centers, the KTO needs to set 
up discretionary expense centers in its current responsibility accounting system. While 
production departments controlling over costs and directly engaging in operating 
activities are organized as cost centers, support departments controlling over costs and 
providing services or assistance to the operating departments are established as 
discretionary expense centers. 
Next, whenever business units transfer goods or services among themselves, 
measuring their revenues and costs requires that a transfer price be established for the 
goods and services exchanged. In order to measure the revenues and costs of 
responsibility centers, each of these internal transactions requires a transfer price. That 
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is, for each unit of the goods and services transferred, the purchasing responsibility 
center pays the transfer price and the providing responsibility center (accounting & 
finance, human resources etc.) receives the transfer price. That is, charge-back system 
should be set up in order to price the goods and services which discretionary expense 
centers (accounting & finance, human resources etc.) provide to other responsibility 
centers.  However, as Zimmerman (1997) and Brickley etc. (1995) emphasize, the 
transfer price should be the forgone profits, or opportunity costs, of the resource in its 
next best use. But though the theory seems simple, measuring opportunity costs can be 
quite difficult in practice. Thus, it can be very time-consuming and costly to develop a 
menu of transfer prices that incorporates most realities without relying on privately-held 
information held by one division. 
Lastly, the current responsibility accounting system could result in cost distortion 
because it fails to include capital costs into the full responsibility costs. Thus, 
management and responsibility managers do not consider important capital drivers as a 
means of managing capital for creating economic value. 
2-3. Suggestions 
Chapter 4 introduces responsibility accounting’s merits, which controls costs, 
reports critical divisional financial performance and motivates the managers of 
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responsibility centers. As mentioned earlier, responsibility accounting have contributed 
much to improving the management of operating costs, it failed to reflect company’s 
balance sheet and hence to account for the full cost of capital employed in business. 
Under such accounting system, management and responsibility center managers 
focus their attention on cost drivers as the tool for managing costs and evaluating 
divisional financial performance. Thus, they do not consider critical capital drivers as a 
means of managing capital for creating economic value.  
Therefore, as discussed earlier, in order to include one of the company’s most 
significant costs─capital charge, the current KTO’s responsibility accounting needs to 
be modified. Then the revised responsibility accounting system, as Cooper and Kaplan 
(1988) 63  emphasize, provides more accurate information about product costs and 
support activities and hence makes management and the managers focus their attention 
on the real full costs of resources consumed with the most leverage for increasing 
economic profits.  
Furthermore, in order to establish more useful and appropriate internal 
management information systems, the KTO needs to combine its current responsibility 
accounting and EVA which is one of the best measures of shareholder economic value, 
                                                          
63 Robin Cooper and Robert S. Kaplan. “Measure Costs Right : Make the Right Decisions,” Harvard 
Business Review (September-October 1988), pp.96-103. 
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and the financial management tool for organizational profitability measurement within 
the organization. That is, the KTO should add capital charges to operating expenses to 
produce its economic profits. These capital charges are traced and allocated to 
individual responsibility centers. 
In more detail, the related methods and steps involved in developing a model on 
linking KTO’s current responsibility accounting to EVA are briefly summarized as 
follows: 1) categorize business units (teams and divisions) into responsibility centers on 
the basis of their authority and responsibility over costs, revenues, profits, and 
investments, 2) attribute directly, assign through drivers, and allocate costs consumed to 
individual responsibility centers, 3) make accounting adjustments to produce net 
operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) and invested capital (IC), 4) estimate the weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC) reflecting the business and financial risk by 
responsibility center of the KTO as a multibusiness company, and 5) measure the 
divisional EVA.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE KTO’S RESPONSIBILITY ACCOUNTING SYSTEM AND 
EVA 
 
1. Building up Responsibility Centers in the KTO 
Companies’ structures fall somewhere in between strong decentralization and high 
centralization because there are both benefits and costs of decentralization, which are 
discussed earlier. In order to choose an organization structure that will implement a 
company’s strategy, top management should compare the benefits and costs of 
decentralization.  
64As Hodak (2000)  holds, companies are generally split into divisions to improve 
managerial decision-making by allowing for specialization and decentralization. That is, 
decentralization is generally a more popular form of organizational design than 
centralization when companies face uncertainties in their environments, require detailed 
local knowledge for performing various jobs, and have few interdependencies among 
divisions (Hansen and Mowen, 1992; Horngren et al., 2003). 
Decentralization is usually achieved by creating decentralized units. One way in 
which decentralized units are differentiated is by the type of responsibility given to the 
                                                          
64 Marc Hodak. “The Viable EVA Center(Or, How TO Slice a Company So It Doesn t Bleed),” Journal of 
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divisional manager.  
Organizing divisions as responsibility centers not only differentiates them on the 
degree of decentralization but also creates the opportunity for control of the divisions 
through the use of responsibility accounting. Thus, responsibility accounting should fit a 
decentralized organizational structure and motivate managers and employees to give 
effort to achieve the organization’s goals to become an effective management control 
system, which is a means of gathering and using information to aid and coordinate the 
planning and control decisions throughout the organization, and to guide the behavior of 
managers and employees. 
As a consequence, to measure the full cost and evaluate the performance of 
subunits in decentralized companies, the management control system uses one or a mix 
of the five types of responsibility centers presented in Chapter 2. The five types of 
responsibility centers are as follows: cost centers, revenue centers, discretionary 
expense centers, profit centers, and investment centers. And these responsibility centers 
differ depending on the degree of authority and accountability given to the local 
manager. Then, as Vancil (1980)65 66 and Maciariello and Kirby (1994)  contend, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Applied Corporate Finance(Fall 2000), pp.72. 
65 Alfred Ra Ppaport. Information for Decision Making : Readings in Cost and Managerial Accounting. 
    3rd ed. Prentice Hall, 1982, pp.299-309. Reprinted from Financial Executive, March 1980. 
66 Joseph A. Maciariello and Calvin J. Kirby. Management Control Systems : Using Adaptive Systems to 
Attain Control. 2nd ed. Prentice Hall, 1994, pp.185-197.   
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autonomy is influenced by the eight separate variables: corporate managers: philosophy 
and style, management process: policies and procedures, diversification strategy, 
business strategy, responsibility structure: custody of physical resources, cost and asset 
assignment, measurement methods: for assigned costs and assets, and rewards: physic 
and tangible.    
With these definitions of five types of responsibility centers and their autonomy 
mentioned above, the business units in the KTO require to be rebuilt up as a 
responsibility center as follows: discretionary expense center (e.g., human resources 
team, finance & accounting team), cost center (e.g., events team, publications team), 
profit center (e.g., tourism development consulting team, Korea tourism education 
center), and investment center (e.g., duty-free shops, golf club). 
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*Complete name of expense center shown above: Discretionary Expense Center
<Figure 12> Responsibility Centers Classified as Expense, Cost, Profit, and Investment Centers  
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2. Setting up Cost and Capital Allocation Method 
In order to provide more accurate cost information including capital costs and 
hence to help managers focus on the real full costs of resources consumed for creating 
economic profits, the KTO first requires to segregate costs attributable to the 
responsibility centers from costs that are not. And also, to trace capital charges to 
responsibility centers, each account balance from the balance sheet first should be 
segmented by responsibility center where the management of the asset takes place and 
then multiplied by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Finally, the capital 
charges are assigned to responsibility centers employing the invested capital .   
As cost methodology (direct attribution, assigned through drivers, allocated) in 
Figure 6 presents, in the first step, only the traceable costs and capital are charged to the 
responsibility centers which consume or employ corporate resources. That is, if a cost 
and capital are not traceable to a responsibility center, then they are not assigned to the 
center. Next, the corporate overhead costs and common assets shared by two or more 
users are assigned through more than one driver by account. Then 
division/department/support team overhead costs and common assets are allocated using 
the allocation bases. Figure 13 summarizes the cost allocation method for responsibility 
costs, presenting the cost-allocation bases of common costs managed by a specific 
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support team such as human resources team and general affairs team. And then 
allocation of corporate headquarters overhead costs (e.g., secretariat, promotion team, 
and so on), corporate service departments overhead costs (e.g., finance & accounting 
team, human resources, etc.), and division/department/support team overhead costs to 
operating teams is illustrated in Figure 13. The cost-allocation bases mentioned above 
are shown in appendix B (see the table in appendix B). And also, Figure 14 depicts the 
processes of assigning and allocating shared costs to each operating team as a 
responsibility center, focusing on the duty-free shops which are investment centers and 
EVA centers.  
 In a similar manner, common assets could be assigned and allocated by 
responsibility center through their capital drivers and allocation bases. 
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<Figure 13> Cost Allocation Method for Responsibility Costs  
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<Figure 14> Cost Allocation Method for Responsibility Costs of Duty-Free Shops 
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3. Calculation of NOPAT and Capital for the KTO 
The net operating profit after taxes (NOPAT) and the amount used for capital are 
not readily available because they don’t come directly off the financial statements.  
In order to compute NOPAT and capital, the amount of equity equivalent reserves 
for certain accounts must be determined first, and the footnotes to the financial 
statements are the primary source for this information (Stewart Ⅲ, 1991; Dierks and 
Patel, 1997). And also, Stewart (1991) calculates NOPAT and capital in two ways: an 
Operating Approach and a Financing Approach. 
In this study, from an operating perspective, the calculations of NOPAT and 
capital for the KTO is made.  
Calculating Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT)  
The net operating profits after taxes (NOPAT) is the profits derived from the 
company’s operations after taxes but before financing costs and non-cash-bookkeeping 
entries.67 With operating approach, we start with sales as a proxy for operating cash 
receipts and then deduct recurring cash economic operating expenses including 
depreciation, but other noncash-bookkeeping entries are ignored. Next, equity 
equivalent (EE) reserve adjustments are made. Interest expense is ignored, but other 
                                                          
67 G. Bennett Stewart, Ⅲ. The Quest for Value : The EVA Management Guide. Harper Business, 1991, 
pp.86. 
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income is added to get Net Operating Profit Before Taxes (NOPBT). Finally, an 
estimate of the taxes payable in cash on these operating profits is subtracted leaving 
NOPAT. The following Figure 15 provides a framework for computing the KTO’s 
NOPAT by responsibility center. 
<Figure 15> Framework for Computing NOPAT by Responsibility Center  
Net operating profits before taxes (NOPBT) 
Less: Cash taxes  
 Income tax provision minus yearly increase in the deferred income tax reserve  
Plus: Changes in equity equivalents 
 Goodwill amortization 
 Increase in Bad debt reserve 
 Unusual loss after taxes 
 
NOPAT 
 
Calculating CAPITAL   
As mentioned earlier, from an operating perspective, capital can be defined as net 
working capital (NWC) plus net fixed assets (NFA). In turn, NWC is current assets net 
of non-interest-bearing current liabilities (NIBCLS), and NFA consist of net property, 
plant and equipment, goodwill, and other long-term capital necessary to run the 
business (Stewart, 1991). 
68 , capital employed is estimated by taking the According to Stewart (1991)
                                                          
68 G. Bennett Stewart, Ⅲ. The Quest for Value : The EVA Management Guide. Harper Business, 1991, 
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standard accounting book value for a company’s net assets and then grossing it up three 
ways: first, to convert from accrual to cash accounting, next, to convert from the 
liquidating perspective of lenders to the going-concern perspective of shareholders, and 
in the final way, to convert from successful-efforts to full-cost accounting. As a result, 
these adjustments produce a more accurate measure of the capital base than is 
represented by conventional accounting book value (Stewart, 1991). 
From the operating approach, mentioned above, we begin with the firm’s total 
assets as reported on the balance sheet and get the NIBCLS (e.g., accounts payable, 
accrued expenses, and income taxes payable) that are netted from current assets to 
compute net working capital. And finally the major adjustments to net assets are to add 
the equity equivalents (EEs) related to the company’s asset accounts, such as goodwill 
amortization and cumulative unusual gains.  
Based on the approach mentioned above, the framework for computing the KTO’s 
capital by responsibility center is presented in the Figure 16.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
pp.69-70. 
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<Figure 16> Framework for Computing CAPITAL by Responsibility Center 
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  +   
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4. Estimating the Cost of Capital  
In order to integrate responsibility accounting with EVA, as discussed in chapter 3, 
the KTO should add capital charges to operating expenses. These capital charges can be 
traced to responsibility centers by means of capital drivers. That is, each responsibility 
center adds the capital charges to the responsibility costs so that the responsibility costs 
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would reflect all costs, including the cost of capital.  
69As Dierks and Patel (1997)  describe in the formula presented, the capital charge 
is the cash flow required to compensate investors for the riskiness of the business given 
the amount of capital invested and the cost of capital or the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) is the minimum rate of return on capital required to compensate debt 
and equity investors for bearing risk to create value. That is, the weighted average cost 
of capital represents the opportunity cost that investors face for investing their funds in 
one particular business instead of others with similar risk and hence includes the 
opportunity costs from all sources of capital: equity, debt, and so on.70  
To determine the weighted average cost of capital (WACC), it is necessary to 
calculate the KTO’s three components: the cost of equity, the after-tax cost of debt, and 
the company’s target capital structure.  
Furthermore, the KTO, as reviewed earlier, is in multiple businesses: tourism 
promotion, resort development, duty-free shops, golf club. Some business units’ 
financial characteristics are significantly different and thus their systematic risk (beta) 
of operating cash flows and their implied capital structure differ by line of business. 
                                                          
69 Paul A. Dierks, and Ajay Patel. “What is EVA, and How Can It Help Your Company?,” Management 
Accounting (November 1997), pp.52-58. 
70 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2005, pp.291-292. 
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71 72Therefore, as Koller et al. (2005)  and Ruback (1998)  present, the KTO requires 
three inputs (target capital structure, cost of equity, and debt cost) to determine the 
opportunity cost of capital by line of business. The cost of capital varies across the lines 
of business because all three of the cost-of-capital inputs could differ for each line of 
business.  
Estimating the Target Capital Structure    
To estimate some business units’ target capital structure in the KTO as a 
multibusiness company, the mean capital structure of several companies in the same 
line of business (e.g., AK, DFS Seoul in the duty-free shop business) is used based on 
Koller et al. ‘s (2005) recommendation. 
In this method, the resulting divisional debt percentages in capital by line of 
business are as follows: 
<Table 11> KTO: Estimating Target Capital Structure for Each Line of Business 
Source of  
Capital  
 Tourism 
Promotion 
 Duty-Free 
Shops 
Resort 
Development
 
Golf Club 
  
Comments 
Debt to Equity 
Debt to Capital 
 1.0 
0.5 
 0.7 
0.4 
0.4 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
 Mean of peers
 
                                                          
71 Op.cit., pp.538-540. 
72 Richard Ruback. Marriott Corporation: The Cost of Capital Case, #9-298-101, Harvard Business 
School, 1998, pp.3-6. 
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Estimating the Cost of Equity   
As described earlier, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is used to estimate 
the cost of equity to establish the weighted average cost of capital.  
However, the appropriate cost of equity capital for each line of business in the 
KTO as a multibuiness company should reflect the risk associated with the industry in 
which that business unit operates, because the systematic risk inherent in its basic 
business operations differs by business unit.  
Furthermore, the systematic risk inherent in the firm’s basic business operations is 
amplified by financial leverage.73 Therefore, with financial leverage, application of the 
cost of capital by line of business to the individual units would result in good 
explanations about the real full costs including capital charges.      
74     Determining the risk free rate; as Koller et al. (2005)  describe, the risk-free 
rate is defined as the return on a portfolio that has no covariance with the market 
represented by a CAPM beta of 0. However, given the cost and complexity of designing 
a zero-beta portfolio, they recommend focusing on long-term government default-free 
bonds.  
                                                          
73 Leveraged Betas and the Cost of Equity Case, #9-288-036, Harvard Business School, 1993, pp2. 
74 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2005, pp.296-297. 
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75In addition, as Copeland et al. (2000)  point out, there are three reasonable 
alternatives that use government securities for estimating the risk-free rate: the rate for 
Treasury bills, the rate for 10-year Treasury bonds, and the rate for 30-year Treasury 
bonds. 
They recommend using a 10-year Treasury bond rate as a proxy to estimate the 
risk-free rate, because the short-term bond rate fails to recognize a bondholder’s 
reinvestment at higher rates and the 30-year Treasury can cause stale prices and yield 
premiums.      
As a consequence, the risk-free rate could be derived from the 10-year treasury 
bonds (the State Treasury of Korea). The 10-year treasury bond rate is 4.95% as of year 
2005. 
     Determining the market risk premium; the market risk premium, as presented 
in chapter 3, is the difference between the expected return on the market portfolio and 
the risk-free rate. The expected risk premium in the future is difficult to estimate. In 
addition, as Koller et al. (2005) hold, no single model for estimating the market risk 
premium has gained universal acceptance.  
However, a common approach is to assume investors expect returns in the future 
                                                          
75 Tom Copeland, Tim Koller, and Jack Murrin. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 3rd ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2000, pp.215-216. 
91 
 
76to be about the same as returns in the past.  The market risk premium is estimated by 
measuring and extrapolating historical excess returns as a reasonable proxy for future 
premium (Koller et al., 2005). To best measure the risk premium using historical data, 
Koller et al. (2005)77 present the following guidelines: calculate the premium relative to 
long-term government bonds, use the longest period possible, use an arithmetic average 
of longer-dated intervals, and adjust the result for econometric issues such as 
survivorship bias. 
Based on the guidelines mentioned above, the market risk premium is produced as 
follows using spread between the arithmetic average Korea Composite Stock Price 
Index (KOSPI) returns for the years 1980 through 2005 and long-term government bond 
returns:  
Risk premium = expected rate of return – risk free rate 
= arithmetic average KOSPI returns – 10-year treasury bond rate 
= 14.18% – 4.95% 
                = 9.23% 
     Determining the beta; According to the CAPM, an asset’s risk is not measured 
                                                          
76 Diversification, the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and the Cost of Equity Capital Case, #9-276-183, 
Harvard Business School, 1993, pp.9. 
77 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2005, pp.298-303. 
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as an individual risk, but the asset’s contribution to the risk of a market portfolio. This 
risk, usually called systematic risk, is measured by the beta coefficient (ß).78  
As Koller et al. (2005) describe, the most common regression used to estimate a 
company’s raw beta is the market model: R  = α+ ßRi m + ε. In the market model, the 
stock’s return (R ) is regressed against the market’s return (Ri m).         
79 80 and Copeland et al. (2000)Fuller and Kerr (1981)  recommend using published 
estimates of beta for listed companies, which is the easiest approach and also employing 
industry averages for unlisted companies such as the KTO or business units. That is, for 
estimating betas for unlisted companies or business units, the pure play method is used. 
According to Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005)81, in the pure play method, the company 
finds several comparable companies in the same line of business as the unlisted 
company or the division, and it averages those companies’ betas to determine its own 
cost of capital.    
In addition, if the pure play firms employ different capital structures than that of 
an unlisted company or business unit, this fact should be dealt with by adjusting the 
                                                          
78 Richard Ruback. Marriott Corporation: The Cost of Capital Case, #9-298-101, Harvard Business 
School, 1998, pp.5. 
79 Russell J. Fuller, and Halbert S. Kerr. “Estimating the Divisional Cost of Capital: An Analysis of the 
Pure-Play Technique,” The Journal of Finance (December 1981), pp.997-1001. 
80 Tom Copeland, Tim Koller, and Jack Murrin. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 3rd ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2000, pp.223-224. 
81 th Eugene F. Brigham and Michael C. Ehrhardt. Financial Management. 11  ed. Thomson South-Western, 
2005, pp.327. 
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betas. That is, as Fuller and Kerr (1981) recognize, in estimating the cost of capital from 
the pure-play cost of capital, the firm’s division and the pure-play are unlikely to have 
the same capital structure.82 In order to derive the cost of capital from the cost of capital 
of the pure-play, Fuller and Kerr (1981) utilize the following Hamada equation:   
ßU = ßL / [ 1 + (1 – T) D / S ] 
Then, the unlevered beta is relevered according to 
ßL = ßU [ 1 + (1 – T) D / S ] 
where 
ßU , ßL : the unlevered beta, levered beta 
S, D: the market values of stock and debt 
T: the corporate tax rate  
Their approach has two steps: 1) unlever the pure-play beta, and 2) relever the 
unlevered beta according to the appropriate capital structure and tax rate of the 
multidivision firm (Conine and Tamarkin, 1985). Moreover, Koller et al. (2005)83 
recommend using industry, rather than company-specific, betas to improve the precision 
of beta estimation. 
                                                          
82 Thomas E. Conine, and Maurry Tamarkin. “Divisional Cost of Capital Estimation: Adjusting for 
Leverage,” Financial Management (Spring 1985), pp.54-58. 
83 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2005, pp.311-313. 
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In sum, to estimate an industry-adjusted divisional beta in the KTO, the following 
five-step process is used: 1) find pure-play firms to determine raw beta, 2) calculate 
each company’s debt-to-equity ratio, 3) unlever each beta using the Hamada equation, 
4) determine the industry unlevered beta by calculating the average, and 5) relever the 
industry unlevered beta employing each company’s target debt-to-equity ratio.  
Table 12 summarizes the estimation of cost of equity and beta for multiple 
businesses in the KTO (for more detailed information, see the table in the appendix C). 
<Table 12> KTO: Estimating Beta and Cost of Equity for Multiple Businesses 
  
  
 Tourism 
Promotion 
 Duty-Free 
Shops 
Resort 
Development
 
Golf Club 
  
Comments 
Unlevered beta  
Corp. tax rate 
Target debt to 
equity 
Relevered beta 
 
Cost of equity 
 0.44 
0.28 
1.0 
 
0.76 
 
11.94% 
 0.44 
0.28 
0.7 
 
0.65 
 
10.98% 
0.47 
0.28 
0.4 
 
0.61 
 
10.59% 
0.32 
0.28 
0.3 
 
0.39 
 
8.52% 
 Mean of peers
Whole firm 
Mean of peers 
 
At target cap. 
structure 
 
Estimating the After-Tax Cost of Debt   
84 85 and Koller et al. (2005)In order to estimate the cost of debt, Stewart (1991)  
recommend to use the prevailing yield to maturity (YTM) of the firm’s own long-term, 
                                                          
84 G. Bennett Stewart Ⅲ. The Quest for Value : The EVA Management Guide. Harper Business, 1991, 
pp.434-444. 
85 Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart, and David Wessels. Valuation : Measuring and Managing 
   The Value of Companies. 4th ed. John Wiley & Sons, 2005, pp.318-322. 
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option-free bonds. According to them, for estimating the cost of debt for a company 
with investment-grade debt, yield to maturity is a suitable proxy.86
In the absence of a quote for its bonds, a company’s borrowing rate could be 
approximated by the rate currently being paid by a sample of companies with the same 
bond rating (Stewart Ⅲ, 1991). 
The KTO does not have publicly traded debt whose yield would indicate the 
company’s marginal cost of debt financing. However, the Korea Investors Service 
(KIS)’s bond rating scoring system positions the KTO as an AAA-rated credit.  
Therefore, the KTO’s borrowing rate is estimated by the yield to maturity 
prevailing on publicly traded bonds issued by a large sample of AAA-rated companies. 
The average long-term bond yields an even 5.57% as of year 2005. As shown in the 
company report, the corporate marginal tax rate is 27.5%. The KTO’s after-tax cost of 
debt thus is produced as follows: 
After-tax cost of debt = Cost of debt × (1 – Marginal tax rate) 
                        = 5.57% × (1 – 0.275) = 4.04%  
Estimating the Weighted Average Cost of Capital by line of business   
Estimating the costs of debt and equity and the target capital structure in earlier 
                                                          
86 Ibid. 
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discussion, we can put them together to arrive at a cost of capital for each line of 
business. This method, as shown in Figure 17, generates the weighted average cost of 
capital for multiple businesses in the KTO. First, to make an estimate of duty-free shop 
business’ beta in the KTO, we use an unlevered beta of 0.44 and its debt-to-equity ratio 
of 68.9%: Levered beta = 0.44[1 + (1 – 0.28)(0.689) = 0.65. Next, to estimate the cost 
of equity, we use a riskless rate of 4.95% and a market risk premium of 9.23%: Cost of 
equity = 4.95% + 0.65(9.23%) = 10.98%. Then, we use a AAA-rated credit for the KTO 
positioned by the Korea Investors Service (KIS) to come up with a pretax cost of 
borrowing of 5.57%. With a marginal tax rate of 27.5% and a debt to capital of 40.8%, 
the cost of capital of the duty-free shop business is: Cost of capital = 10.98%(0.592) + 
0.0557(1 – 0.275)(0.408) = 8.15%.  
Using these procedures, the cost of capital by line of business in the KTO is 
presented in the following Table 13.  
<Table 13> Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) by Line of Business 
  
  
Tourism 
Promotion 
Duty-Free 
Shops 
Resort 
Development 
  
Golf Club 
WACC 7.99% 8.15% 8.62%  7.42% 
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<Figure 17> Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) for Duty-free shop Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cost of Equity 
10.98% 
Cost of Debt 
5.57% (1-0.275) 
=4.04% 
Weights 
E=31.1%  D=68.9% 
Risk-Free Rate 
Government Bond 
Rate = 4.95% 
+ 
Beta 
0.65 
× Risk Premium 
9.23% 
Unlevered Beta for
Sectors
 
5. Measuring Capital Charges and EVA 
Although the KTO’s responsibility accounting system has contributed much to 
improving the measurement of operating costs consumed by responsibility centers and 
the evaluation of their performance, it fails to account for the full cost of capital. 
Responsibility costs are therefore understated.  
Consequently, as suggested in Chapter 4, the KTO’s responsibility accounting 
: 0.44 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) = 10.98% (0.592) + 4.04% (0.408) 
                                    = 8.15% 
Synthetic Rating = AAA
Firm’s D/E 
Ratio: %  68.9
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system should be combined with EVA to provide more accurate cost information 
including capital costs and hence to help managers focus on the real full costs of 
resources consumed for creating economic profits. As Hubbell (1996)87  presents, 
economic value added (EVA) is simply operating profits after tax less a charge for the 
capital used in creating the profits.  
<Table 14> Applying Responsibility Accounting to EVA Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Events Team Incheon Airport Jungmun Beach Jeju Office
(KRW amounts in millions) Duty-Free Shop Golf Club
Revenues -                  114,462         9,304            16,591          
   Net sales -                  109,710         -                    15,880          
   Other income -                  4,752             9,304            711               
Cost of goods sold 570             62,817           1,318            3,428            
   Gross profit (570) 51,645 7,986 13,163
Operating expenses:
   Salaries 412             3,897             2,488            865               
   Rent expense -                  29,064           2                   12                 
   Depreciation -                  556                298               487               
   Selling expenses -                  2,760             303               -                   
   Other operating expenses 35               1,120             2,270            2,525            
   Total Operating Expenses 447             37,397           5,361            3,889            
Segment Margin (1,017) 14,248 2,625 9,274
   Allocated Support Dept. Costs -                  1,078             161               161-               
Contribution Margin 1 (1,017) 13,170 2,464 9,435
   Allocated Corp. Overhead Costs 430             383                385               202               
Contribution Margin 2 (1,447) 12,787 2,079 9,233
   Invested capital 315             24,773           11,402          103,683        
   Capital charge 25               2,018             846               8,934            
Economic Value Added (1,472) 10,769           1,233            299               
Responsibility Centers
 
                                                          
87 William W. Hubbell. “A Case Study in Economic Value Added and Activity-Based Management,” 
Journal of Cost Management (Summer 1996), pp.21-29. 
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The capital charge by responsibility center then is calculated by multiplying its 
cost of capital times the capital employed (defined as net working capital plus net fixed 
assets) by responsibility center. Table 14 illustrates the impact of including capital 
charges on responsibility costs for the KTO’s responsibility centers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
1. Summary of Results 
As examined in the literature review, method of linking responsibility accounting 
to EVA and the case study of this study, there are some findings to be summarized as 
follows:  
▪  In the first place, as Benston (1963) argues, decentralization serves both to 
allow the managers the necessary freedom and authority needed for motivation and to 
encourage them to supervise their workers effectively. And decentralization is aided 
effectively by responsibility accounting. 
▪  Next, examined in Chapter 2 of this study, there are five different types of 
responsibility centers (discretionary expense center, cost center, revenue center, profit 
center, and investment center or EVA center) and related financial performance 
measurement systems to link together decentralized decision-making.  
▪  Thirdly, cost allocations could be useful devices for controlling and motivating 
managers and a potent tool in motivating greater goal congruence between a firm and its 
employee based on Zimmerman’s cases and Blanchard and Chow’s argument.  
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▪  In the fourth step, whenever responsibility centers transfer goods or services 
among themselves, correct transfer prices need to be established for the goods and 
services exchanged to measure their performance. Getting the transfer price right is very 
important because incorrect transfer prices can result in inappropriate decisions, the 
reduced firm value, and inappropriate promotion and retention decisions. 
▪ The responsibility accounting needs to reflect company’s balance sheet and 
hence to account for the full cost of capital employed in business. Including one of the 
company’s most significant costs─capital charge, the responsibility accounting system 
provides more accurate information about responsibility costs and hence makes 
management and the managers focus their attention on the real full costs of resources 
consumed with the most leverage for increasing economic profits. 
 ▪  As we examined in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 of this research, the responsibility 
accounting could be linked to EVA which is one of the best measures of shareholder 
economic value and the financial management tool for organizational profitability 
measurement in order to build up more useful and appropriate internal management 
information system. 
2. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Limitations    
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In the study, by and large, there might be four kinds of the limitations of this study. 
The first limit belongs to the absence of information concerning transfer prices which 
each of internal transactions requires. Because developing an accounting system capable 
of capturing all the synergic effects or coming up with appropriate transfer prices tends 
to be either impossible or a highly complicated and costly undertaking, the KTO has not 
designed and implemented a transfer pricing system that captures these transactions. 
Next, there remains basic limitation inherent in the pure-play approach. Since the beta 
for a division of a company or a nonpublic company is unobservable in the marketplace, 
a proxy beta derived from a publicly traded company whose operations are most similar 
to the division or the company in question is used as the measure of its systematic risk. 
As a result, if we have difficulty selecting a pure play engaged in line of business that is 
as similar as possible to the firm’s division (e.g., tourism promotion), the resulting beta 
may not be a reasonable proxy for the division. In addition, the third restriction stems 
from measuring the full responsibility costs including capital costs. Tracing costs 
directly to cost objects eliminates the need to allocate or assign costs. Under KTO’s 
responsibility accounting system, costs that cannot be charged directly are be assigned 
through allocation bases. For this approach to be valid, the allocation bases should be 
highly correlated with cost drivers and capital drivers. In practice, every allocation base 
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used in the KTO does not assign costs and capital to responsibility centers on a cause-
and-effect basis. When costs including capital charges are improperly assigned among 
responsibility centers in the KTO, cost distortion can occur. Lastly, the fourth limitation 
comes from the characteristic inherent in financial measures. As Kaplan and Atkinson 
(1998) point out, EVA also is one of the traditional methods to measure and monitor the 
performance of decentralized units solely by financial measures. Increasingly, many 
people are now questioning the appropriateness of assessing performance using a highly 
aggregate number such as net income and EVA. 
Suggestions for Future Research    
This research does not provide any guideline for establishing correct transfer 
pricing system capturing intercompany transactions. As discussed earlier, it can become 
very time-consuming and costly to develop a menu of transfer prices that incorporates 
most realities without relying on privately-held information held by one responsibility 
center. However, in order to provide incentives for the responsibility center managers to 
take into account the consequences of their actions on the other responsibility centers’ 
performance, In the future, additional research into designing and implementing an 
appropriate transfer price system would be needed 
An increased and coordinated approach to selecting appropriate allocation bases 
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for costs and capital not to result in cost distortion will represent a significant 
opportunity for responsibility accounting and product costing. Therefore more detailed 
research into building up costs (including capital charges) allocation method on a cause-
and-effect basis is strongly needed in the future. 
In addition to these, to gain a better understanding of why managers are moving 
beyond single, financial performance measures for decentralized units, a broad set of 
financial and nonfinancial measures need to be reviewed to motivate and evaluate the 
performance of the responsibility center. 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
<Table 1> Measuring a Firm s NOPAT and CAPITAL 
 
Computing NOPAT 
Financing Perspective Operating Perspective 
Net operating profits before taxes Income available for common 
(NOPBT), excluding unusual losses Stockholders 
or gains   + Interest expense after taxes 
+ Implied interest on noncapitalized  + Implied interest expense on non- 
leases capitalized leases after taxes 
- Cash taxes - Interest and other passive investment 
Provision for income taxes    income after taxes 
- Increase in deferred tax reserve + Preferred dividend  
+ Marginal taxes saved (paid) on  + Minority interest provision 
   unusual losses (gains)  
+ Marginal taxes saved on interest  
  expense on debt and implied  
  interest on noncapitalized leases  
- Marginal taxes paid on interest   
  and other passive investment  
  income  
+ Changes in equity equivalents + Changes in equity equivalents 
Increase in LIFO reserve Increase in deferred tax reserve 
Increase in bad debt reserve Increase in LIFO reserve 
Goodwill amortization Goodwill amortization 
Increase in (net) cumulative Increase in bad debt reserve 
   expensed intangibles, e.g., Increase in (net) cumulative 
R&D and product development   expensed intangibles, e.g., 
Increase other reserves, such   R&D and product development 
  as for inventory obsolescence, Unusual loss (gain) after taxes 
warranties, deferred income Increase other reserves, such 
   as for inventory obsolescence, 
   warranties, deferred income 
= NOPAT = NOPAT 
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 <Table 1> (continued) 
 
Computing CAPITAL 
Financing Perspective Operating Perspective 
Total assets  Common equity 
- Marketable securities and construction+ Interest-bearing debt 
   in progress + Present value of noncapitalized leases
+ Non-interest-bearing current liabilities+ Capitalized leases 
+ Present value of noncapitalized leases- Marketable securities and 
+ Equity equivalents    construction in progress 
LIFO reserve + Preferred stock 
Bad debt reserve + Minority interest 
Cumulative goodwill amortization + Equity equivalents 
 Unrecorded goodwill Deferred tax reserve 
Increase in (net) cumulative LIFO reserve 
(Net) cumulative expensed Bad debt reserve 
intangibles, e.g., R&D and Cumulative goodwill amortization 
product development  Unrecorded goodwill 
Cumulative unusual loss (gain) Increase in (net) cumulative 
  after taxes (Net) cumulative expensed 
Other asset-contra reserves, such asintangibles, e.g., R&D and 
product development for inventory obsolescence, 
warranties Cumulative unusual loss (gain) 
   after taxes 
 Other reserves, such as for 
 inventory obsolescence, 
    warranties, deferred incom 
= CAPITAL = CAPITAL 
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 APPENDIX B 
 
<Table 1> Cost Allocation Bases 
Common Costs   Basis for Allocation Related Team 
Medical checkup 
Athletic meeting 
Social insurance expenses 
Telephone charges 
Electric charges 
Water rates 
Natural gas charges 
Office and IT supplies 
Uniform 
Information systems  
maintenance & repair 
Training 
 Percentage of salaries  
Number of employees  
Percentage of salaries 
Number of employees  
Square footage occupied 
Number of employees 
Square footage occupied   
Number of employees   
Number of salespersons 
Number of employees 
  
Number of employees 
(excluding temp. employees)
Human Resources  
Human Resources 
Human Resources 
General Affairs 
General Affairs 
General Affairs  
General Affairs  
General Affairs  
Planning & Promotion 
Information Systems 
Operation 
Human Resources 
 
 
Corporate Headquartes  Basis for Allocation Cost Object 
CEO 
Board of Directors 
Office of Audit 
Secretariat 
 
 Number of employees  
Number of employees  
Number of employees  
Number of employees 
Each team in six divisions 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
 <Table 1> (continued) 
Service Departments/Teams Basis for Allocation Cost Object 
Planning and Coordination Dept. 
Innovation Management Team 
General Affairs Team 
Human Resources Team 
Finance & Accounting Team 
Legal Affairs Team 
Emergency Planning Dept. 
Customer Satisfaction Center 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Number of employees 
Operating team in  
five divisions 
excluding division for 
management 
Overseas Marketing Support Dept. 
Tourism Complex Develop. Dept. 
Duty-free Business Dept. 
Corp. Business Support Team 
Planning and Promotion Team 
Purchasing Team 
Number of employees 
Number of employees  
Revenues 
Revenues 
Revenues 
Revenues 
Operating team in 
a specific business unit 
involved 
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APPENDIX C 
 
<Table 1> Calculation of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
 
 
1. Target Capital Structure
 Source of KTO Duty-Free Resort
 Capital Shops Development Golf Club
AK HANHWA LAND ORA
 Debt 27,032,231,024    143,670,519,655       6,221,350,000     
   Sho
  Cap
 
   L
 
 Cap
 D
 
  D
rt-term debt 27,032,231,024    86,340,000,000         588,630,000        
  Long-term debt -                            57,330,519,655         5,632,720,000     
 Equity 31,378,096,210    363,218,031,728       117,396,310,895 
ital 58,410,327,234    506,888,551,383       123,617,660,895 
 Debt to Equity 1.0 0.9                        0.4                             0.1                       
 Debt to Capital 0.5 0.5                        0.3                             0.1                       
DFS SEOUL DAEMYNUNG JEJU
 Debt 3,000,000,000      53,722,137,899         32,740,487,137   
  Short-term debt 3,000,000,000      13,055,387,899         32,740,487,137   
ong-term debt -                            40,666,750,000         -                           
 Equity 12,233,040,424    95,621,914,561         2,574,005,121     
ital 15,233,040,424    149,344,052,460       35,314,492,258   
ebt to Equity 0.2                        0.6                             12.7                     
 Debt to Capital 0.2                        0.4                             0.9                       
Mean Mean Mean
 Debt to Equity 0.7                        0.4                             0.3                       
ebt to Capital 0.4                        0.3                             0.2                       
 2. S
 
ystematic Risk (Beta)
Tourism Duty-Free Resort
Promotion Shops Development Golf Club
Levered beta 0.93 1.02 1.18 1.1
 C
 
 
 
orp. marginal tax rate 0.26 0.23 0.27 0.3
Debt to equity 1.27 1.39 1.31 2.80
Industry beta 0.85 0.9 0.91 0.95
ated unlevered beta 0.48 0.49 0.60 0.37
Estimated unlevered beta* 0.44 0.44 0.47 0.32
orp. marginal tax rate 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28
Target debt to equity 1.00 0.7 0.4 0.3
Relevered beta 0.83 0.74 0.79 0.45
elevered beta* 0.76 0.65 0.61 0.39
source: www.kisinfo.com
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<Table 1> (continued) 
 3
 
. Market Risk Premium
   * Risk-free rate
2005 yr 2004 yr 2003 yr 2002 yr 2001 yr 2000 yr
 
10
 
 
  
 In
  * Expected rate of return
Composite Stock Price
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dex Returns
Arithmetic
Avg. Return
1980-2005 14.18%
1994-2005 6.13%
1999-2005 7.02%
Composite Stock Price Index Composite Stock Price
(Average) Index Returns
1980 yr 108.91 -
1981 yr 126.63 16.27%
1982 yr 122.17 -3.52%
1983 yr 121.73 -0.36%
1984 yr 131.81 8.28%
1985 yr 138.71 5.23%
1986 yr 227.80 64.23%
1987 yr 416.70 82.92%
1988 yr 692.44 66.17%
1989 yr 918.73 32.68%
1990 yr 746.00 -18.80%
1991 yr 657.98 -11.80%
1992 yr 585.73 -10.98%
1993 yr 728.37 24.35%
1994 yr 965.28 32.53%
-year Treasury Bond 4.95% 4.73% 5.05% 6.59% 6.86% 7.76%
(State Treasury of Korea)
source: Money & Banking Statistics (2006. 1), The Bank of Korea
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<Table 1> (continued) 
 Composite Stock Price Index Composite Stock Price
(Average) Index Returns
1995 yr 934.92 -3.15%
1996 yr 833.4 -10.86%
1997 yr 654.48 -21.47%
1998 yr 406.07 -37.96%
1999 yr 806.83 98.69%
2000 yr 734.22 -9.00%
2001 yr 572.83 -21.98%
2002 yr 756.98 32.15%
2003 yr 679.83 -10.19%
2004 yr 832.92 22.52%
2005 yr 1071.36 28.63%
source: KOREA EXCHANGE
 
 
 
 
 
 
    * Risk premium
Spread between Composite Returns
and L/T Govt. Bond Returns
1980-2005 9.23%
1994-2005 1.18%
1999-2005 2.07%
 
 
 
4. Cost of Equity
Tourism Duty-Free Resort
Promotion Shops Development Golf Club
 
 Co
 
st of Equity 12.59% 11.78% 12.26% 9.08%
Cost of Equity* 11.94% 10.98% 10.59% 8.52%
 5. 
 
Cost of Debt
After-tax cost of debt Marginal tax rate*
4.04% 27.5%
*source: Company report
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<Table 1> (continued) 
 
6. Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
Tourism Duty-Free Resort
Promotion Shops Development Golf Club
WACC 8.32% 8.62% 9.79% 7.84%
WACC* 7.99% 8.15% 8.62% 7.42%
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